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When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) took power in Japan in 2009, both Japanese 
and American observers feared sea changes in Japanese security policy. Compared to the long-
governing and familiar Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the DPJ seemed young and 
inexperienced, farther left and less ideologically coherent, and eager to make policy change for 
change's sake. The DPJ has appeared to earn this reputation over the last three years, as 
exemplified by its early mishandling of reorganization plans for U.S. military installations in 
Okinawa, which prompted widespread criticism both within Japan and from U.S. alliance 
managers and observers. 
 
This notion of a hapless DPJ is only partly correct. The DPJ government has indeed 
begun to popularize and politicize Japanese security policy, leaving security decisions more 
exposed to political and public leverage. This reflects the party’s anti-bureaucratic policymaking 
instincts, its top-heavy structure, and its promotion of two-party competition. In some ways, 
though, the party has been a victim of its own success. It has stumbled most badly over the most 
high-profile, politically salient issues: military base politics, incidents surrounding territorial 
disputes, North Korea crisis management. This has reflected poor coordination more than 
misguided or unpopular policy stances. 
 
But at the same time, on many substantively important but less politically salient issues – 
arms non-export policies, military-military relations with South Korea, the updating of National 
Defense Program Guidelines – the DPJ is quietly progressing along a security policy trajectory 
that is familiar, constructive, and not particularly worrying for either the U.S. or the Japanese 
public. This pattern may be somewhat reassuring for American alliance managers, but it suggests 
the need to watch for gradual politicization of previously under-the-radar security matters. It also 
suggests that the handling of security policy has new potential to vex all incumbent Japanese 
governments, DPJ-led or otherwise, and thereby to contribute to governance destabilization 











When the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) first took power in 2009, it was an unknown 
quantity – and thus a worrisome one – to many observers of Japanese security policy and U.S.-
Japan relations, both within Japan and in the U.S. Compared to the long-governing, familiar, and 
reliably pro-U.S. Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), the DPJ appeared young and inexperienced, 
farther left and less ideologically coherent, eager to make policy change for change’s sake, and 
eager to ignore the accumulated wisdom of Japan’s bureaucracy.  
 
Less glaring but similarly important, the party took power within a Japanese 
policymaking environment that had already begun to amplify the (potential) influence of public 
and political opinion. Through repeated institutional reforms and reorganization, Cabinet power, 
particularly the power of Prime Minister, was strengthened. The greater “presidentialization” of 
political leadership and a greater emphasis on two-party competition triggered politicization of a 
wide range of policy issues, including those, such as security policy, that had been considered 
“non-political.” Such popularization is not problematic in itself – after all, it is the essence of 
democracy. But to those that are satisfied with the status quo, it poses a threat to the stability and 
predictability of security policy, especially when the very leaders promoting popular influence 
are thought to lack the knowledge and leadership skills needed to wield such influence wisely.  
 
But how much more popularized and politicized is the security policymaking process 
under the DPJ becoming? More importantly, has any such change in process led to any tangible 
change in policy outcomes? 
 
Through its first three years in office, the DPJ has indeed appeared to earn its unreliable 
reputation. In the area of security policy, the party has both suffered notable failures 
demonstrated notable differences from the policy supported by the LDP. The party’s difficulties 
have been exemplified by its mishandling of various security-related items:  
 
Ø Reorganization plans for U.S. military installations in Okinawa, most notably Futenma 
Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS), immediately upon taking office in 2009. 
Ø The collision between a Chinese fishing trawler and a Japan Coast Guard ship off the 
Senkaku Islands in 2010.  




These stumbles prompted widespread criticism both within Japan and from the U.S., and they 
have hastened the resignation of two DPJ prime ministers in two years. 
  
Ironically, one can argue that the party has been a victim of its own success. The DPJ’s 
pursuit of two-party competition and anti-bureaucratic policymaking indeed has begun to 
popularize and politicize Japanese security policy, leaving security policy decisions more 
exposed to political and public leverage. The party so far has tripped most badly over the most 
high profile, politically salient issues – military base politics, incidents surrounding territorial 
disputes, and North Korea crisis management – and has been punished more for poor policy 
execution than for misguided or unpopular stances. The party’s organizational structure, 
meanwhile, has the potential to continue to inject considerable inexperience and volatility into 
policymaking. 
 
The characterization of the DPJ as “simultaneously radical and hapless” is only partly 
correct, however. In particular, on many substantively important but less well-publicized or 
politically salient issues – such as arms non-export policies, military-military relations with 
South Korea, and the updating of National Defense Program Guidelines – the DPJ actually 
quietly progresses along a security policy trajectory that is familiar, constructive, and not 
particularly worrying for either the U.S. or the Japanese public.1 Though this pattern may be 
reassuring to the US, it still suggests the need to be aware of the risk of politicization of 
previously under-the-radar security issues. It also suggests that the management of security 
policy has new potential to vex all incumbent Japanese governments, DPJ-led or otherwise, and 
thereby to contribute to governance destabilization across the board in Japan. 
 
                                                
1 For similar arguments concerning the DPJ’s maintenance of Japan’s security policy trajectory, if not the 
correlation of success with low political salience, see Jeffrey Hornung, “Japan’s DPJ: The Party of 
Change,” PacNet 24 (April 4, 2012); Rikki Kersten, “Japanese Security Policy Formation: Assessing the 
Koizumi Revolution,” Australian Journal of International Affairs 65:1 (2011), 5-23; and Paul Midford, 
“Japan’s Security Policy under the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ),” ISPI Analysis 81 (December 2011). 
For an argument that the DPJ retains a good portion of its opposition-nurtured DNA and may well deviate 
significantly from the status quo, see Daniel Sneider, “The New Asianism: Japanese Foreign Policy under 
the Democratic Party of Japan,” Asia Policy 12 (July 2011), 99-129. For a more neutral forecast made 
during the early days of the DPJ administration, see Leif-Eric Easley, Tetsuo Kotani, and Aki Mori, 
“Electing a New Japanese Security Policy? Examining Foreign Policy Visions within the Democratic 
Party of Japan,” Asia Policy 9 (January 2010), 45-66. For a pre-DPJ argument concerning built-in 
pressures toward continuity in Japan’s security policy trajectory, see Christopher Hughes, “Japan’s 
Military Modernisation: A Quiet Japan-China Arms Race and Global Power Projection,” Asia-Pacific 
Review 16:1 (2009), 84-99. 
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Below, we discuss how the DPJ’s policy positions, party structure, and policymaking 
style have injected new popular inputs into security policymaking since the party’s rise to power, 
and whether these changes have actually led to changes in policy outcomes. 
 
 
NEW POPULAR INPUTS IN JAPANESE SECURITY POLICYMAKING 
DPJ Policy Stances 
 
“Popular inputs” into the Japanese security policymaking process have undergone 
significant changes in the last decade. They have primarily surfaced with the emergence of the 
Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) as a capable challenger to the LDP and then as Japan’s 
governing party – that is, first as a party with indirect influence over security policy, and then as 
the party with most immediate control. They also reflect the emergence of a more genuine two-
party political system in Japan and the displacement of a governance system dominated by the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and often characterized as opaque and corrupt. This is 
something for which the DPJ clearly deserves the most credit, but the two-party competition that 
the ascendance of the DPJ introduced will present new types of policy inputs regardless of which 
of the two parties (if either) governs. 
 
First, contrary to common impressions, the DPJ is not particularly leftist. More 
significant is the fact that the party is diverse and uncoordinated in its opinions – not necessarily 
along ideological lines – to the point that it is sometimes extremely difficult to distinguish “the 
DPJ’s position” on a given security policy issue from that of the LDP.  
 
As mentioned, the DPJ is not particularly leftist. The party is often described as 
“progressive” or “center-left,” but this reflects two misguided assumptions: that the party hasn’t 
evolved beyond its more genuinely left-wing roots, and that if the LDP is a center-right party, the 
DPJ must be center-left. The center-left label fits only for certain aspects of the DPJ’s approach 
to security policy (and to politics more generally). Of course, the DPJ does have more leftist 
influences than the LDP. Moderate Socialists and a few “liberal conservative” defectors from the 
LDP founded the DPJ, and some prominent former Socialists, such as Sengoku Yoshito (Chief 
Cabinet Secretary under Prime Minister Kan Naoto) and Yokomichi Takahiro (former governor 
of Hokkaido and the incumbent speaker of the House of Representatives)2, now occupy 
                                                
2 Throughout this paper, Japanese names appear according to Japanese practice, with family names first 
and given names second, except in citations of those English-language publications in which Japanese 
authors’ names are listed with family name last.  
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important leadership positions. Furthermore, the party continues to rely on labor unions, 
traditionally leftist, for electoral support. Nevertheless, leftist/liberal influence within the DPJ 
has waned over the years since the party was first formed in 1998. 
 
Reduced leftist influence within the party can be attributed to the process of DPJ’s 
expansion as a political party. The DPJ grew into a major party largely by absorbing successive 
waves of conservative politicians that defected from the LDP, including Ozawa Ichirou and the 
members of his Liberal Party in 2003 and other political descendants of the groups that originally 
left the LDP in 1993. In addition, many of those DPJ original members who were formerly 
Socialists lost their Diet seats before the party had amassed much electoral strength, only to be 
replaced by new candidates or the conservatives absorbed from other parties. Today, 
conservatives outnumber former Socialists and other leftist/liberal elements within the DPJ, 
especially among the party’s rank-and-file. The few remaining former Socialists are not 
organized into a coherent sub-group of their own, but rather are divided among several of the 
party’s groups.  
 
To the extent the DPJ maintains its leftist political origins, these are as much about 
consumer-advocate, social-issue leftism – i.e., a brand of leftism not trained directly on security 
issues – as they are about traditional Japanese leftism. One observes nothing close to the 
polarization found in the Republic of Korea (ROK) or Taiwan. At the same time, those within 
the DPJ who focus on security issues have tended to be conservatives or former members of the 
Democratic Socialist Party of Japan (a center-left party relatively hawkish on security in part 
because the Japanese defense industry employed some of its private-sector labor supporters).3 
 
In fact, leftist/liberals have more potential to exert influence on the DPJ through the 
Social Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ). As the former junior partner in the DPJ’s initial 
governing coalition, the SDPJ enjoyed policy influence that its defectors among the DPJ rank 
and file lack, despite its increasing irrelevance in Japanese domestic politics overall. In some 
cases, the SDPJ exerted influence through direct intra-coalition negotiations; in others, DPJ 
politicians supporting progressive policies conveniently blamed purported Socialist pressure. The 
latter pattern describes the DPJ’s rejection of revisions to the Three Principles of Arms Exports 
called for in the revised 2010 National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG). Both types of 
SDPJ influences were likely at work in the Hatoyama administration when the government 
revisited Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma relocation plans. Ultimately, the SDPJ quit 
the DPJ-led government in May 2010 because its stance on Futenma was rejected by the DPJ. It 
has remained outside the coalition since. Today, the SDPJ needs the particular balance of power 
                                                
3 Personal interview with DPJ staff official. 
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in the Diet in order to stay relevant—the party itself is only likely to decline in numbers as time 
passes. Its inability to join the ruling coalition will only accelerate its decline. 
 
As observed above, the leftist ideological current within the DPJ may not be as strong as 
it is often perceived. Instead, internal discord and lack of coordination on almost all policy issues, 
including security policy, looms large as a major characteristic of the DPJ. As discussed below, 
this is reflected in the party’s approach to policymaking and therefore may continue to be 
applicable for the foreseeable future. Unlike the LDP and SDPJ, the DPJ has no basic document 
– a koryo or manifesto or platform – that both establishes a party consensus on basic policies and 
remains consistent over time. There are many groups that function similar to LDP’s factions 
developing within the DPJ, but these groups are divided more by personal ties and disagreements 
over the distribution of senior party posts and policy style than they are divided over policy 
content, let alone foreign and security policy content. For instance, prior to Ozawa’s departure 
from the DPJ, a clear cleavage had already begun to emerge between “pro-Ozawa” and “anti-
Ozawa” politicians. In this environment, security policy may be used as a proxy for factional 
disputes, rather than a legitimate issue for policy debate within the party. Even attempts to 
ameliorate factional disagreements can have indirect policy effects. Prime Minister Noda 
Yoshihiko, for example, appointed Ichikawa Yasuo and then Tanaka Naoki – both of whom were 
considered allies of Ozawa – as his first and second defense ministers in part to make an overture 
toward Ozawa and his supporters, despite these two politicians’ clear lack of defense policy 
expertise.4 
 
There are some areas in which the DPJ is both relatively united and distinct from the 
LDP. Still, these areas tend to involve approaches to security policy rather than outcomes. Some 
may worry the U.S., while others allow the DPJ to pull Japanese security policy in a direction 
agreeable to U.S. interests. 
 
On the positive side, the DPJ is not as burdened by the legacy of Japan’s wartime past 
vis-à-vis Asia as the LDP has been. It is also not beholden to domestic pressure groups with non-
strategic foreign policy views, such as the Japan War-Bereaved Association (Izokukai) or the 
association of the families of North Korean abductees, which tend to be more conservative. 
Furthermore, the DPJ is not handicapped by the party history that has led the LDP to avoid 
certain initiatives for fear of association with heavy-handed wartime or immediate post-war 
policies – for example, improved intelligence-gathering capabilities and the secret Diet sessions 
                                                
4 Takao Toshikawa, “Barons Anoint Noda,” The Oriental Economist 79:9 (2011), 3-4. 
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this might involve.5 Thus, all else equal, the party has a freer hand to pursue closer relations with 
its Asian neighbors.  
 
More generally, the DPJ may be inclined to take a less “status quo” approach to foreign 
policy and security. This often result in an inconsistent policy direction, however. For example, 
the Hatoyama administration, the first DPJ government, publicly pondered reassessing the U.S.-
Japan alliance and developing stronger ties with China. But the Kan administration, the second 
DPJ administration, demonstrated its willingness to admit a greater emphasis on China relative to 
North Korea, as reflected in the “dynamic defense” concept within the 2010 NDPG and the 
initial apprehension of the Chinese trawler captain in the Senkakus incident in September 2010.  
 
Three years of DPJ rule suggests that the higher profile the issue is, the more likely it is 
for the DPJ to try to differentiate itself, as reflected in the Hatoyama administration’s move to 
reevaluate Futenma MCAS relocation plans. The DPJ also often attempts to differentiate itself – 
largely for differentiation’s sake – by insisting on transparency. The DPJ’s decision to 
investigate and publicize secret understandings between Japan and the U.S. regarding the 
introduction of nuclear weapons into Japanese territory is an indication that the DPJ, at least at 
the time, attached great significance to demonstrating difference from the LDP, often without 
regard to potential diplomatic and other repercussions. 
New DPJ Party Structure 
 
The DPJ has a different structure than the LDP. Most significant is that the DPJ is 
bottom-heavy with inexperienced legislators. This party demographic concentrates the party’s 
policymaking authority in the hands of a small cadre of leaders, without much opportunity for 
others in the party to chime in on policy debates. This leaves security policy more vulnerable 
than before to mismanagement and volatility. 
 
Overall, the DPJ is an inexperienced party with only a small group of veteran legislators. 
As of June 2012, of 291 DPJ affiliates in the Lower House, fully 129 were elected to that House 
for the first time in the DPJ landslide of 2009, 33 were serving their second terms, and 49 more 
were serving their third terms.6 In other words, nearly half the party’s Lower House legislators 
                                                
5 Personal communication with former Self-Defense Forces official. 
6 Data on DPJ Lower House member characteristics are from the Lower House’s web site at 
http://www.shugiin.go.jp/index.nsf/html/index_kousei4.htm, current as of February 20, 2012. There are 
nine DPJ Lower House members who served terms in the Upper House before joining the Lower House. 
For simplicity’s sake, we count each Upper House term as equivalent to two Lower House terms in 
calculating those legislators’ experience here, since Upper House terms are fixed at six years and Lower 
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had only about three years’ experience, and nearly three-quarters had less than ten years’ 
experience. The number of DPJ Lower House members who had served more than six terms – 
the level of seniority traditionally required by the LDP to be considered for a Cabinet post – was 
just 32, or slightly more than ten percent. The incumbent DPJ prime minister, Noda Yoshihiko, 
is serving his fifth term. 
 
Many DPJ legislators also lack career backgrounds that might compensate for their lack 
of political experience. The DPJ has not aggressively recruited candidates with high-quality 
experience applicable to governing, such as prefecture-level politicians or national bureaucrats.7 
The party does have a comparatively strong record of recruiting candidates with policy analysis 
backgrounds, such as graduates of the advanced policy academy Matsushita Seikeijuku. This 
adds a policy perspective not commonly found within the LDP, but one that is more theoretical 
than applied. 
 
This general lack of expertise extends straightforwardly to security policy. Identifiable 
“go-to” legislators are few: chiefly, Kira Shuji, Maehara Seiji, Nagashima Akihisa, and former 
Defense Minister Kitazawa Toshimi, alongside generalists like Ozawa Ichirou and Sengoku 
Yoshito who frequently weigh in on security issues. Party officials confirm that there is no 
particular effort under way to recruit new members strong on national security issues.8 To be 
fair, the same might be said for the LDP, in which former Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru and a 
few others are often entrusted with much of that party’s heavy lifting on security matters.9 This 
reflects a system-wide dynamic in Japan: security policy expertise is not particularly valuable 
politically, given the country’s limited policy autonomy and the subordinate role, at least until 
recently, of defense specialists within the defense policymaking bureaucracy. 
 
As noted above, the DPJ concentrates policymaking power at the top, allocating most 
power to its relatively small cadre of veteran legislators. To some extent, this follows directly 
from its Diet members’ inexperience. But it also represents deliberate decisions not to construct 
mechanisms that diffuse knowledge and responsibility to party “backbenchers.” The party might 
                                                                                                                                                       
House terms average about three. This ignores the fact that some Upper House members resign to run for 
the Lower House before completing their last six-year Upper House term. As of July 18, 2012, after 
Ozawa and 49 others left the DPJ, the party’s affiliates in the Lower House numbered 251.  
7 Ethan Scheiner, Democracy Without Competition in Japan: Opposition Failure in a One-party 
Dominant State (Cambridge University Press, 2006), and Robert Weiner, “The Evolution of the DPJ: 
Two Steps Forward, One Step Back,” in Leonard J. Schoppa, ed., The Evolution of Japan’s Party System 
(University of Toronto Press, 2012), 63-68. 
8 Personal interview with DPJ staff official. 
9 Personal interview with LDP Diet member staff aide. 
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have used the same approach even if its backbenchers were more senior, and might indeed 
continue to do so as its backbenchers grow more senior. 
 
Even with decision-making authority limited to a very small number of politicians, power 
within the DPJ is not distributed according to a clear hierarchy. The LDP remains the more 
hierarchical party in the sense that it boasts a well-articulated and clear organizational structure. 
In addition to the position of the party president, the LDP designates three senior party leaders 
(Secretary-general, Chair of the Policy Affairs Research Council, and Chair of the General 
Council) who enjoy prestige and seniority over other party positions. In particular, the position of 
Secretary-general, responsible for managing all aspects of election campaigns and other party 
operations, was often held by the most influential politicians within the LDP. In the LDP, 
seniority governs appointments for internal party posts and corresponding appointments as 
cabinet ministers, deputy ministers, and parliamentary vice-ministers. Indeed, the LDP has 
instituted unwritten rules prescribing the amount of experience required to serve in any given 
position.10  
 
In practice, the LDP’s well-articulated, multi-level hierarchy of senior and junior 
positions, combined with frequent rotation in and out of all positions, has served to train junior 
members by ensuring that they gradually gain responsibility and experience communicating with 
senior politicians and relevant bureaucrats as they rise through the party hierarchy. It is 
noteworthy that the party’s own internal hierarchy duplicates and expands upon the 
corresponding hierarchy within the bureaucracy. Policy-relevant experience is thus found among 
those LDP politicians not chosen to take government posts, and among the entire party when out 
of power. 
 
The DPJ’s party structure, on the contrary, is more flat and egalitarian. The party’s rules 
do identify a “standing council” of party leaders that includes 19 positions. In addition, there are 
11 “regional representatives.” Although the DPJ mirrors the LDP’s three “senior” positions of 
Secretary-general, Policy Affairs Council Chair, and Chair of the Administration Committee, 
these positions do not carry as much importance or influence within the party, and relationships 
among them are not as clearly defined. 
 
Unlike the LDP’s hierarchical personnel system, the DPJ’s relatively flat and egalitarian 
structure does not offer much opportunity to train its members. Furthermore, the structure is not 
wholly egalitarian. At the top is a relatively small group of leaders, including those who hold 
senior party positions, veterans with unofficial power, and Cabinet ministers. They enjoy at least 
                                                
10 Satou Seizaburou and Matsuzaki Tetsuhisa, Jimintou seiken (Chuuou Kouronsha, 1986). 
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some level of policymaking power by virtue of their positions, while the rest of the party is, by 
and large, left out. Ministry of Defense officials confirm that while their consultations with 
cabinet ministers are more frequent than before, their involvement with the DPJ as a party – that 
is, with any members of a DPJ defense policy zoku (“tribe”), Policy Research Council 
committees, and so on – has declined. The DPJ more closely models a Cabinet-led, 
Westminsterian style of governing.  
 
The DPJ had always been critical of the close relationship during LDP rule between 
government and party – that is, between the LDP-led Cabinet and parallel policymaking 
institutions within the LDP. Under the LDP, it was not uncommon for that party to act as if prior 
party approval was required for the government to proceed with important policy decisions. DPJ 
leaders, including Ozawa, believed that this “dual governance” often led to a lack of 
accountability, and that the government and ruling party should therefore speak in unison on 
policy matters, with the party deferring final decision to the government. Indeed, the Hatoyama 
government aimed to streamline the policy- and decision-making process so as to place final 
decision-making authority with the Cabinet. At Ozawa’s strong recommendation, then-Prime 
Minister Hatoyama also eliminated the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) within the DPJ 
on September 16, 2009. Furthermore, as soon as the party gained control over the policymaking 
process, it excised from all policy- and decision-making processes any members not holding 
party or government positions. One defense official remarked that the DPJ encouraged internal 
information and opinion exchange more in its days in the opposition: once it took control of 
government, incentives to maintain active intra-party policy debate disappeared, in part due to 
the elimination of internal party organization to support such activities and in part because 
opposition lawmakers simply had more time.11  
 
One of the unintended consequences of restricting authority to a limited number of party 
leaders is the weakening of any mechanism within the DPJ for developing future leaders. As a 
criterion both for advancement within the party and for policymaking, skill at politics, 
particularly domestic politics, often tends to trump skill at policy. DPJ members with greater 
strengths as generalists, such as Minister of Foreign Affairs Genba Kouichirou and Minister of 
the Environment Hosono Goushi, have come to enjoy more influence than foreign and security 
policy specialists, such as Policy Research Committee Chair Maehara Seiji and Nagashima 
Akihisa, in terms of both formal selection to party and Cabinet posts and informal influence in 
policy deliberations over issues within the specialists’ very areas of expertise.12  
 
                                                
11 Personal interview with Ministry of Defense official. 
12 Asahi Shinbun, September 2, 2011, 3. 
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This distinction does not necessarily correlate with any progressive-conservative 
distinction, as exemplified by the prominence of former Socialist and former Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Sengoku Yoshito. Such specialists as Maehara and Nagashima may be the DPJ 
members most vocal and visible to American alliance managers and within international security 
dialogues, but may not be the most influential within the DPJ itself. One analyst, for example, 
remarks that Maehara, the DPJ’s Policy Research Council Chair at the time, was widely 
criticized within the DPJ for taking the initiative to discuss compensation for Korean “comfort 
women” – that is, women forced to serve as sex slaves for Japanese soldiers during World War II 
– and for broaching the possibility of reviewing Japan’s three principles of arms non-export and 
its rules for the use of weapons in peacekeeping activities. “Maehara’s statements, using his 
position as Policy Research Committee Chair without coordinating with the government or 
ruling parties, was a ‘crime of conscience,’” according to a senior DPJ leader.13 
 
The DPJ is also less able to make up for its legislators’ inexperience with outside 
expertise, given Japan’s relatively weak security and foreign policy think-tank infrastructure.14 
The DPJ could exploit Japan’s bureaucracy to this end but is broadly unwilling to do so. The 
party has clamped down on legislators’ contacts with bureaucrats – to an extreme degree upon 
first taking office, but still to some extent today – thus cutting legislators off from bureaucrat-led 
study groups and briefings. 
 
The DPJ’s inclination to inject more popular influence into policymaking, combined with 
the overall inexperience of the party’s members and severe power concentration, could leave 
Japanese security policy more vulnerable to poor or idiosyncratic political leadership. Most 
immediately, inexperienced policymakers are more likely to mismanage policy, as demonstrated 
by the Hatoyama administration’s approach to MCAS Futenma. The DPJ’s security policy 
inexperience might be mitigated if the party were to adopt the approach of the LDP, which 
deferred to bureaucrats more often. But the DPJ so far has chosen to amplify the effects of its 
security policy inexperience through an approach that emphasizes political influence. 
Meanwhile, the DPJ’s political interventions can only come from the top, making them more 
likely to be grand and sudden.15 The LDP provided its members more diffuse institutional means 
to intervene in policymaking, which allowed such interventions to be more incremental and 
spread more thinly and widely. Leadership by a small elite cadre also increases the possibility of 
erratic policy should the cadre’s members disagree.  
 
                                                
13 Takao Toshikawa, “Edano Speaks: On Maehara, Ozawa, Sengoku, Others,” The Oriental Economist 
79:11 (2011), 3. 
14 Personal interviews with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official and LDP staff official. 
15 Personal interview with Ministry of Foreign Affairs official. 
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Furthermore, concentrating power among a small cadre of leaders tends to stretch thin 
those with decision-making authority. At any given time, as many as 20 to 25 percent of the 
party members with six or more Lower House terms under their belts might be tasked with 
Cabinet positions. Security and foreign policy experts must sometimes cover other issue areas, in 
part to fill gaps and in part to gain generalist experience useful for party leadership – as, for 
example, when Maehara served as Minister for Land, Infrastructure, Transport, and Tourism. 
Meanwhile, the DPJ leaves itself with a “weak bench,” a problem whose effects are heightened 
for governing parties, which churn through leaders more quickly than their opposition 
counterparts (especially in parliamentary systems, with their lack of guaranteed term lengths). 
Prime and other Cabinet Ministers’ responsibility for policy puts them on short leashes in the 
eyes of citizens and media. Prime ministers, in particular, also cannot be recycled as easily: 
former prime ministers rarely return to that post, or to the Cabinet at all. This leads to more 
volatile rotations among the small group of more experienced leaders, and volatility in personnel 
allows more volatility in policy. It also more quickly exhausts the supply of such leaders and 
brings less experienced politicians to power. During the DPJ’s decade-plus in opposition, the 
party had five different leaders, with multiple stints for party co-founders Hatoyama and Kan. 
Upon taking power, Hatoyama and Kan served and resigned as prime ministers, giving the party 
three different leaders in less than three years.  
 
The problem is more acute in specialized fields like defense, where the party’s “bench” is 
particularly weak, as noted above. After two years in office, the DPJ’s first Defense Minister, 
Kitazawa, yielded to two successive non-specialists, Ichikawa and Tanaka, both of whom were 
ultimately removed for poor performance. In June 2012, to replace Tanaka, the party tapped 
academic Morimoto Satoshi, having exhausted, at least temporarily, its supply of security policy 
expertise among parliamentarians.  
 
A longer-term concern is that the DPJ’s hierarchical style might trigger overall party-
system volatility by leaving junior legislators unhappily underutilized and thus more likely to 
leave the party. This has recently come to pass in the form of another departure by Ozawa, who 
left the DPJ on July 2, 2012 with 49 DPJ legislators in tow.  
New DPJ Policymaking Process 
 
The DPJ also approaches the policymaking process differently from the LDP, and in a 
way that usually amplifies the influence of popular (public and party-driven) opinion. During the 
election campaign of the summer of 2009, the DPJ differentiated itself from the ruling LDP by 
emphasizing that a DPJ-led government would be guided by “seiji shudo,” or “political 
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leadership,” unlike past LDP governments, which the DPJ claimed relied heavily upon 
bureaucracy for policy expertise. The DPJ also argued that it would seek a more transparent 
governing style. Though this emphasis on policymaking process was not why Japanese voters 
propelled the DPJ into government – most voters were simply tired of the series of weak and 
indecisive LDP-led governments that followed Koizumi Jun’ichirou’s resignation as prime 
minister in September 2006 – the DPJ followed through on its campaign pledge and launched 
several initiatives to help ensure that politicians, not technocrats, were in charge of government 
decision-making.  
 
Upon first taking office in 2009, the Hatoyama administration quickly consolidated 
policy decision-making power among a small group in the Kantei (Prime Minister’s Office) and 
Cabinet, isolating both foreign policy and defense bureaucrats and the party’s own non-Cabinet 
legislators. This approach took advantage of executive-strengthening reforms that had begun a 
decade before, but the new DPJ government also displayed clear political will, lacking in prior 
governments, to exploit and accelerate these reforms. 
 
Soon after becoming prime minister, Hatoyama eliminated the DPJ’s Policy Affairs 
Research Council (PARC). This body, loosely modeled on its longstanding counterpart within 
the LDP, had served as a “shadow Diet committee” system in which DPJ legislators could debate 
and formulate policy initiatives. It also served as a vehicle for bureaucrat-led “study sessions,” 
something particularly valuable for the DPJ members with fewer terms in office. More 
importantly, these study groups served to provide a forum for policy deliberation for legislators 
not currently occupying government positions – that is, for the large majority of legislators who 
at any given time are not serving as Cabinet ministers or ministers’ deputies. Eliminating the 
PARC and its related study groups may have unified policymaking authority under the Cabinet 
and lessened the influence of the DPJ as a party relative to the DPJ government. Ironically, 
however, it also effectively prohibited DPJ politicians from engaging in anything more than 
informal policy discussions, robbing them of the opportunity to develop areas of policy expertise. 
 
Hatoyama also established a National Strategy Bureau (NSB, or kokka senryaku kyoku) 
with an eye toward further strengthening political leadership. To this end, Hatoyama created a 
new cabinet-level position, Minister in Charge of National Strategy (kokka senryaku tantou 
daijin), and appointed Kan Naoto to the position (because the establishment of the NSB required 
Diet approval, the National Strategy Office [(kokka senryaku shitsu] was established as its 
precursor in the meantime). At the same time, the Hatoyama government eliminated the Cabinet 
vice ministers’ meeting (jimu jikan kaigi), a regular coordination meeting held among 
administrative vice ministers (that is, the top non-politically-appointed official in each ministry) 
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prior to Cabinet meetings. The DPJ viewed these as a symbol of politicians’ dependence on the 
bureaucracy. Meanwhile, the government established as the ultimate decision-making body 
within each ministry the Three Political Appointees Meetings (seimu sanyaku kaigi) for 
ministers, deputy ministers (fuku daijin), and senior parliamentary vice-ministers (seimu kan) – 
that is, for the only political appointees within each ministry.  
 
The party has not only created multiple such bodies, including the Government 
Revitalization Unit, but also failed to establish clear official lines of authority or a predictable de 
facto division of labor among them and other unofficial policymakers within the party. On 
security policy matters in particular, the DPJ also established a freestanding advisory panel, 
headed by former Defense Minister Kitazawa, independent of both the Cabinet and the Policy 
Research Committee.16 
 
The DPJ’s structural reforms were driven by a deep sense of distrust and outright 
rejection of bureaucratic expertise. Bureaucrats, amid this decline in policymaking potency, 
cultivated symmetrical distrust of DPJ policymakers. As months went by, criticism grew that 
DPJ politicians simply refused to listen to bureaucrats as a matter of principle, even when not 
knowledgeable about policy issues, and that this resulted in the Hatoyama government’s making 
erratic decisions on issues important for Japan, raising concerns about DPJ’s ability to govern. 
Meanwhile, defense bureaucrats remain highly wary of political control. They describe the DPJ, 
in particular, as amateurish, disorganized, vacillating, and insufficiently concerned with security 
policy. In particular, bureaucrats have been put off by the DPJ’s inability to make a decision as a 
party and the lack of transparency surrounding the policymaking process. Foreign affairs and 
defense officials repeatedly point to the DPJ’s “lack of a decision-making process” as a source of 
frustration.17  
 
With each of its three successive yearlong administrations, though, the DPJ has gradually 
(though not yet entirely) backtracked away from its insistence on political leadership and the 
isolation of bureaucrats. Hatoyama and the DPJ leadership began to relax their rules in January 
2010, permitting DPJ members to receive briefings from government officials within 
parliamentary committees. Following Hatoyama’s failed attempts to revise the Futenma MCAS 
reorganization plans without the benefit of bureaucratic input and his subsequent resignation in 
May 2010, the DPJ leadership, under Prime Minister Kan and Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku, 
reinstated the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC), as well as bumon kaigi (Policy 
                                                
16 Asahi Shinbun, February 21 and 22, 2012, 4. 
17 Personal interviews with Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. 
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Department Meetings).18 Kan’s successor, current Prime Minister Noda, has directed all of his 
cabinet members to “optimize the potential of the bureaucracy” and has reinstated regular 
meetings among the administrative vice ministers of all government agencies and augmented the 
position of the DPJ’s PARC as the key organization in the DPJ’s policymaking process. He 
further emphasized the importance of that decision by appointing former Foreign Minister Seiji 
Maehara as its chairman (though, as noted above, even this position is no guarantee of policy 
influence). 
New Party System 
 
In addition to the changes in policy-making environment brought about by the 
ascendance of the DPJ, broader, system-level changes in Japan’s party system, beyond the DPJ’s 
own attributes as a governing party, also stand to impact security policy.  
 
First, two-party competition – that is, two-party competition with parties that are similar 
to each other but not identical – promises greater politicization of security policy. Greater 
politicization can result in part from the DPJ’s own efforts – for example, its going out of its way 
to politicize issues like MCAS Futenma relocation or secret U.S.-Japan nuclear weapons 
agreements. But it can also reflect new government-opposition dynamics. Under the 1955 
System’s pairing of a center-right LDP government with an opposition Socialist party that hewed 
strongly to the left on security and foreign policy, differences between the two parties on security 
policy were certainly important. Indeed, some argue that these differences, as much as any other 
single policy area, defined the difference between the two parties and their voters. But this 
cleavage between the two parties was inert. The parties’ separation on policy grounds was so 
vast and clear, and the opposition’s stance so delegitimized in the eyes of all but its own 
supporters, that security policy debates were unlikely to translate into political pressure on the 
LDP. Now, Japan’s two major parties are close enough “on the merits” with regard to security to 
leave security policy open for real contestation. This allows security to become a front-burner 
issue. 
 
Meanwhile, the LDP is an unusual opposition party: a “party of government” that finds 
itself in opposition. As such, it is different than its own opponents used to be. But whether this 
stands to make the opposition LDP more responsible or more reckless remains unclear. As the 
author of the main currents of Japanese security policy and the U.S.-Japan alliance, the LDP is in 
a difficult position to criticize DPJ policies that remain relatively consistent with its own – that 
                                                
18 Personal interview with a Ministry of Defense official, December 2011.  
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is, at least, when it doesn’t enjoy a blocking majority in one house of parliament.19 Criticizing 
the DPJ on security also has the potential to create rifts within the LDP itself when the LDP is 
not fully unified on the issue at hand.20 At the same time, the LDP’s oxygen is government 
power, with the distributive benefits and prestige governing brings. The LDP is also now free of 
the need to consult as closely with its former governing coalition partner Koumeitou.21 The party 
may be particularly motivated to regain and maintain power, even at the expense of policy 
consistency.  
 
Japan’s overall political process is also growing more subject to popular influence in a 
manner reminiscent of the early 20th-century Progressive era in the United States. This does not 
necessarily imply that elections will increasingly serve as decisive referenda on security policies. 
Nevertheless, security policy may prove indirectly affected if increasing popularization selects 
for different types of leaders or makes such selection more volatile in several important ways. 
 
First, both the DPJ and LDP now select their leaders through primaries rather than 
deliberations among party elites. Prospective leaders who enjoy widespread support among 
parliamentarians but not in the mass media or among the public at large – for example, Ozawa in 
his leadership contest against former Prime Minister Kan – are now at a decided disadvantage. 
 
Second, the prime ministership has grown “presidentialized.”22 Prime ministers, as well 
as opposition leaders who style themselves as prospective prime ministers, have become the 
public faces of their respective parties to an extent not seen under the previous 1955 System. 
This is especially the case when elections are approaching, and thus will prove more significant 
when national elections begin to occur more frequently (unlike the unusual and partly 
coincidental drought of national elections in the three years since 2009). 
 
Third, election results have grown more volatile even as the set of viable national parties 
has grown more stable. The DPJ’s and LDP’s fortunes have swung wildly from one national 
election to the next. This most threatens – and thus promises to make more sensitive to public 
opinion – the youngest and least influential parliamentarians, but it affects current and rising 
leaders as well. 
 
                                                
19 Personal interviews with Ministry of Defense officials. 
20 Personal interview with LDP staff official. 
21 Personal interview with LDP Diet member. 
22 Ellis S. Krauss and Benjamin Nyblade, “’Presidentialization in Japan? The Prime Minister, Media, and 
Elections in Japan,” British Journal of Political Science 35:2 (2005), 357-368. 
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None of these processes particularly selects for leaders with foreign and security policy 
knowledge, given the relative distance of such matters from the minds of Japanese voters. These 
processes also tend to yield shorter leadership careers – witness the short tenures of all Japanese 
prime ministers other than Koizumi over the last fifteen years – and thus a higher “burn rate” 
through existing policy expertise. 
 
Note that electoral system change is not one of the system-wide political process changes 
that promises to increase the importance or politicization of Japanese security policy. Despite 
some arguments to the contrary, the switch in 1996 to an electoral system dominated by 
plurality-rule, single-member districts has not made public goods like defense more electorally 
important than pork barrel. One finds little evidence that candidates or parties are campaigning 
based on their foreign and security policy positions. They might juxtapose their own purported 
expertise with the bumbling of the opposite party, but that does not constitute the public-goods-
driven approach often argued to result from the adoption of single-member districts. 
 
 
HAS SECURITY POLICY ACTUALLY CHANGED UNDER DPJ RULE? 
It seems to go without saying that the DPJ has the potential to impact Japanese security 
policy – and negatively so from the perspective of the United States. The clearest example, and 
the one that served as the party’s “first impression” upon its taking power, was the Hatoyama 
administration’s attempted re-negotiation of Futenma MCAS relocation plans between August 
2009 and May 2010. DPJ policymakers went out of their way to re-examine previously 
established agreements between Japan and the U.S., consulted defense and foreign affairs 
bureaucrats only minimally, and displayed poor coordination among themselves in the process – 
and were then widely blamed for policy failure. Though the immediate end result was a reversion 
to the status quo ante preferred by the U.S., the path to that result involved an unnecessary 
expense of resources on both countries’ parts and strained relations between the two. 
 
But this was an unusual episode of security policymaking: an inexperienced governing 
party and unsteady prime minister were dealing with an unusually sensitive issue. How 
representative is Futenma of DPJ policymaking? Has the DPJ’s ample potential for policy 
change, rooted in its policy preferences, party structure, and approach to the policymaking 
process, indeed resulted in much policy change? Or, more to the point, how much undesirable 
change has the DPJ brought about? Have early concerns about the party, partly aggravated by its 
performance over Futenma, been borne out?  
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Examined more broadly, the DPJ’s policy record proves not to be so worrisome, 
especially from the perspective of U.S.-Japan alliance supporters (a group that includes the 
majority of Japanese citizens, who support the alliance at least tacitly). The party has committed 
high-profile errors, some of them “unforced,” but in many areas it has also maintained the status-
quo trajectory of gradual expansion of the Japan Self Defense Force’s roles and capabilities and 
overseen the strengthening of the U.S.-Japan alliance. 
 
We also observe a rough correlation between greater popular influence and unsuccessful 
policy. The security policy areas in which the DPJ has stumbled most badly are those most 
politically salient to the Japanese public. This is not simply a matter of policy failures becoming 
politically salient, though that certainly happens as well. Rather, the DPJ has found it difficult to 
handle inherently salient, politicized, “hot-button” issues. In some cases, the DPJ has gone out of 
its way to pursue policy change on these issues; in others, outside events have forced the party to 
grapple with them. Ironically, the very issues on which the DPJ has succeeded in its policy-
process goals of imposing more public and political influence on policy have been those issues 
on which the party has proven least able to impose its vision for policy outcomes. On the other 
hand, on issues not highly visible to the public at large, the DPJ has made policy changes that not 
only escape public criticism but also constitute progress in the eyes of mainstream security 
professionals in both Japan and the United States – and such “under the radar” issues are 
numerous and significant. 
  
Recent security policy developments might be grouped into one of three categories. First, 
high-profile stumbles: cases of DPJ policymaking that garnered great public attention but poor 
results from both the DPJ’s and the United States’ points of view, exemplified by the Futenma 
MCAS wrangle. Second, rare high-profile domestic successes for the DPJ, with varying degrees 
of desirability to American alliance managers, as exemplified by Operation Tomodachi and the 
cessation of Indian Ocean refueling. Third, and most notable here, a significant number of lower-
profile policy initiatives pushed by the DPJ and largely welcomed by the United States. 
High-profile Stumbles 
 
Prime Minister Hatoyama’s mishandling of the Futenma MCAS relocation issue neatly 
showcased the various aspects of security policy mismanagement many feared from the DPJ. 
Indeed, it helped create these fears, since it represented the first substantial security policy 
initiative the party took upon gaining power. The details of Hatoyama’s approach to the Futenma 
issue have been well rehearsed elsewhere, but here we briefly recount the relevant elements. 
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Hatoyama’s inexperience and apparent policymaking naiveté was combined with 
extremely poor coordination among top DPJ officials within the party and government. Target 
dates for “back to the drawing board” relocation solutions were loudly trumpeted but often 
unmet – and the most crucial of these was clumsily scheduled for two months before an 
impending Upper House election. Cabinet ministers freelanced and floated the names of 
potential base relocation sites without informing their colleagues, and they openly aired 
disagreements about how to proceed.23  
 
The party largely ignored input from Japan’s defense and foreign affairs bureaucrats. 
Though then-Defense Minister Kitazawa himself cultivated strong relationships with his 
ministry, these were trumped by standoffishness on the part of the Prime Minister’s Office and 
Cabinet.24 Members of Japan’s Defense and Foreign Ministries stress that their opposition was 
not to politicians’ taking the lead on such a sensitive subject, since political leadership provides 
helpful cover for bureaucrats’ work, but that the Futenma process often involved flat-out 
exclusion of bureaucratic expertise.25 
 
Though the reasons behind Hatoyama’s insistence on forcing the Futenma issue are still 
debated and poorly understood, the most plausible among them suggest attempts to manipulate 
the issue for popular appeal rather than genuine, policy-rooted concerns. Some point to a DPJ 
attempt to win Okinawan voters in particular, though the notion that the DPJ might go out of its 
way to challenge the foundations of the U.S.-Japan alliance simply to solidify victories in little 
more than one percent of the Lower House’s districts – districts in which minimal DPJ 
organizational infrastructure existed to consolidate any short-term gains in any case – seems 
shortsighted even by the low standards imputed to the DPJ by its critics. More generally, though, 
Hatoyama appears to have made an attempt to appeal to the Japanese electorate at large by 
confronting the U.S. and thereby differentiating the DPJ from the LDP. This proved to be ill- 
advised. Though the Japanese electorate outside of Okinawa is not unsympathetic to limited 
adjustments to Japan’s alliance with the United States, it does fundamentally value the alliance. 
A well-orchestrated and well-explained effort to reevaluate the alliance might garner support, but 
the DPJ’s poorly coordinated effort suggested that the party stood to be poor stewards of the 
alliance more broadly. 
 
The Kan government was also heavily criticized in Japan for its failure to effectively 
respond to a Chinese trawler that rammed into a Japan Coast Guard vessel near the disputed 
                                                
23 Daniel Sneider, “Déjà Vu on Okinawa: Is There a Crisis in US-Japan Relations?,” The Oriental 
Economist 77:11 (2009), 1-3. 
24 Personal interview with Ministry of Defense official. 
25 Personal interviews with Ministry of Defense and Ministry of Foreign Affairs officials. 
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Senkaku Islands, and to Russian President Medvedev’s surprising visit to one of the islands in 
the contested Northern Territories shortly before Japan hosted the Asia-Pacific Economic 
Cooperation (APEC) meeting in November 2010.  
 
DPJ Defense Ministers Ichikawa and Tanaka, both novices in the field, also committed a 
series of gaffes that undermined confidence in both their individual viability as ministers and the 
DPJ’s ability to pursue defense policy effectively. Ichikawa described himself as a novice in one 
of his first press conferences and professed ignorance about details of the 1995 rape of a 
Japanese schoolgirl by three U.S. servicemen, but went on to make an analogy to rape when 
describing the Futenma MCAS relocation itself.26 Tanaka displayed unfamiliarity with basic 
policy issues during Diet deliberations, once left an Upper House Budget Committee meeting 
without authorization, and had his intended dismissal of the Defense Ministry’s Okinawa 
Defense Bureau Chief vetoed by subordinate officials despite that Chief’s apparent inappropriate 
involvement in electioneering within Okinawa.27 Almost by definition, however, these mini-
scandals were of more symbolic than substantive importance.  
High-profile Successes 
 
Security policies that have successfully dealt with issues highly visible to the Japanese 
public have been rare. Perhaps the clearest example has been Operation Tomodachi (or 
“Friend”), the joint humanitarian assistance/disaster relief (HA/DR) effort undertaken by Japan’s 
Self-Defense Forces and the U.S. military following the Great Eastern Japan Earthquake of 
March 11, 2011.28 HA/DR operations constitute a classic “valence” issue: they tend to be 
universally supported so long as they are carried out competently. The two nations’ forces did 
just that. The potential for poor management and/or public resistance to large-scale mobilization 
of the SDF certainly existed, as the Japanese government’s poorly received response to the 1995 
Kobe Earthquake makes clear. But Kobe’s lessons appeared to have been well absorbed, and 
critical accounts of Operation Tomodachi are nearly impossible to find (at least among open-
source materials available to date). 
 
Another DPJ policy initiative well received within Japan – though not by U.S. alliance 
managers – was the termination in January 2010 of the Japan Maritime Self Defense Forces’ 
(JMSDF) refueling operations in the Indian Ocean in support of U.S. and allied forces engaged 
                                                
26 Yomiuri Shinbun, December 5, 2011. 
27 Asahi Shinbun, February 5, 2012, 4; Sankei Shinbun, February 7, 2012, 2. 
28 Note the distinction between Operation Tomodachi and the roundly criticized Japanese response to the 
nuclear power plant failures triggered by that day’s natural disasters, which is not considered security 
policy for the purposes of this report. 
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in Afghanistan. In contrast with Futenma, Indian Ocean refueling offered an ideal opportunity 
for the DPJ to set itself apart clearly – but politically safely – from the LDP and the status quo of 
the Japan-U.S. alliance, thanks to the highly asymmetrical political salience of the operation. 
SDF deployments, even in comparatively safe and politically uncontroversial environments, are 
closely watched within Japan. But to the United States, the JMSDF’s contribution carried more 
symbolic than operational importance. The DPJ’s quick cessation of the operation upon taking 
power – as promised in its election campaign – constituted a notable, if not extremely weighty, 
policy success for the party. 
Low-profile Successes 
 
 A significant amount of Japanese security policy under the DPJ, though, involves low-
profile successes that either maintain the pre-DPJ security policy trajectory or largely improve 
upon it (from the point of view of Japanese citizens and elites and United States alliance 
managers alike). In most cases, these policy initiatives have remained out of public view not due 
to any effort to suppress their coverage, but rather due to the nature of the policy areas 
themselves – that is, their inherent lack of interest to the general public and, by extension, to 
ambitious politicians. That the public less closely watches these policy areas by no means 
suggests they are unimportant. If anything, in many cases, the Japanese public and media pay 
less attention to them because of their complexity, and their complexity reflects their importance.  
 
As discussed at length below, the DPJ issued National Defense Program Guidelines 
(NDPG) that could just as easily been issued by the LDP, despite the DPJ’s having produced 
them through an enhanced process of political deliberation.29 The 2010 NDPG, which aims to 
guide Japanese security policy in the medium term, not only reaffirms Japan’s core alliance 
commitments, but also calls for a significant shift in the alignment of SDF forces from a Cold 
War-era, ground-based, northern orientation to a post-Cold War, maritime-focused, southern 
orientation with explicit consideration of Chinese military trends as part of a new doctrine of 
“dynamic defense.” Concrete changes included an increase in the size of Japan’s submarine fleet 
from 16 to 22, “one of the largest submarine buildups of the post-war era.”30 
 
The DPJ has maintained Japan’s ballistic missile defense (BMD) development and 
cooperation with the United States, and under Prime Minister Kan moved to increase the size of 
                                                
29 Personal interviews with LDP staff official and DPJ Diet member. 
30 Paul Midford, “Options Vis-à-vis PRC, US,” The Oriental Economist 80:2 (2012), 11-14. See also 
Masao Kobayashi, “‘Sensuikan 22-seki taisei’ no kaijou bouei,” Gunji kenkyuu (December 2011). 
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the Aegis fleet by two.31 BMD, though a vitally important arena of security policy, is less apt to 
capture the interest of average citizens due to its technical complexity, with the important 
exception of periods of crisis response to North Korean missile launches, as in April 2012. 
Notably, Japan’s slow response to that actual launch earned the DPJ widespread criticism, but its 
enthusiastic response to the deployment of BMD assets in cooperation with the U.S. in the weeks 
leading up to the launch may be the more important underlying policy development. Relatedly, 
the party has gradually pushed for the relaxation of the Three Principles of arms non-export, in 
part to ease participation in such U.S.-led ventures as BMD and the development of the next-
generation F-35 fighter plane.32 
 
The party has also continued to push for the creation of a Japanese version of the U.S.’s 
National Security Council as a means of unifying and streamlining security and crisis 
management, an initiative originally proposed by LDP Prime Minister Abe Shinzou.33 
 
The DPJ has worked to improve relations with Asian neighbors other than China, 
contrary to early concerns that the party might align Japan more closely with China at the 
expense of the United States and other partners in Asia. South Korea has been a particular focus. 
As noted above, the DPJ enjoys a favorable position vis-à-vis the ROK thanks to its lack of 
baggage with regard to tensions over island sovereignty disputes and interpretations of historical 
Japanese-Korean relations (though tensions over these issues have certainly not disappeared, and 
matters are also helped by the fact that the South Korean presidency is occupied by conservative 
Lee Myung-Bak and that recent North Korean provocations have provided vivid incentive for the 
two democracies to cooperate). The DPJ has moved Japan closer to signing bilateral military 
pacts with South Korea, though grievances over historical issues threaten progress – notably, 
more so on the South Korean side. Seoul has sent observers to U.S.-Japan Keen Sword exercises 
for the first time, and the SDF has observed U.S.-ROK exercises for the first time. Then-Prime 
Minister Kan apologized to South Korea upon the 100th anniversary of Korea’s annexation by 
imperial Japan. Japan and South Korea have signed a civilian nuclear pact setting the terms for 
transfer of nuclear technology and agreements to jointly develop mines for rare-earth metals. 
Under the DPJ, Japan has also continued to expand strategic relationships with Australia, India, 
Vietnam, and the Philippines.34  
 
Finally, the DPJ has maintained and even expanded SDF overseas deployment activity 
(tame by U.S. standards, perhaps, but significant by Japan’s), establishing the SDF’s first 
                                                
31 Midford, “Japan’s Security Policy.” 
32 Nihon Keizai Shinbun, December 21, 2011, 3; Asahi Shinbun, December 28, 2011, 3. 
33 Sankei Shinbun, February 29, 2012, 2. 
34 Hornung, “Japan’s DPJ.” 
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permanent overseas base in Djibouti in 2010 to support anti-piracy operations, exploring the 
stationing of SDF personnel on U.S. territory in the Northern Marianas, and dispatching Ground 
Self Defense Force units to South Sudan on a United Nations peacekeeping mission in 2012.35 It 
has also begun to explore relaxing the standards governing SDF members’ use of weapons to 
allow for protection of international and NGO officials, or even other countries’ troops, 
operating outside of the SDF’s own bases.36 
The Role of Political Salience 
 
A number of factors may distinguish the security policy issues on which the DPJ 
succeeds – both by its own standard and by those of the United States – and those on which it 
stumbles. One simple rule of thumb that seems to have emerged, however, is that security policy 
areas more salient to the Japanese public are those where the DPJ fares worse. 
 
 Politically salient issues are ones that popular actors – politicians, and especially citizens 
– are aware of, engage with, and develop opinions about, to the point that a foundation exists for 
popular pressure on policymakers (even if such pressure actually emerges only occasionally). 
Relatively few security issues are politically salient. Only some aspects of security policy align 
with longstanding political and historical themes, allow easy packaging and presentation by mass 
media and political actors, and thereby become easily comprehensible and/or politically 
motivating to average citizens. Many others are “under the radar” and largely fail to penetrate 
voters’ consciousness, despite substantive importance recognized by security policymakers and 
analysts.  
 
Of course, certain security policy issues are predictably salient, and thus more sensitive to 
popular and political influence. That is, a given issue’s degree of political salience is at least in 
part exogenous, and not simply the endogenous product of media or politician efforts to make the 
issue salient. Policy areas that should always be expected to have high public salience in Japan 
generally touch on Japan’s wartime history and subsequent constitutional constraints on military 
power. These include dispatches of Self Defense Force to highly violent areas (that is, specific 
dispatches, as opposed to the general legal infrastructure surrounding such dispatches), territorial 
disputes with Asian neighbors, U.S. military installations in Okinawa (though salience for this 
issue area is often low in mainland Japan), and revisions to the Constitution. Responses to 
immediate incidents and crises also tend to be highly salient. This, of course, is not a novel 
                                                
35 Sankei Shinbun, February 22, 2012, 1; Nihon Keizai Shinbun, April 18, 2012, 1. 
36 Asahi Shinbun, February 29, 2012 (evening ed.), 2; Mainichi Shinbun, March 7, 2012, 5; Asahi 
Shinbun, March 15, 2012, 4. 
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observation in itself. But note the distinction between responses to incidents and crises and 
policies enacted in anticipation of incidents and crises. Japan’s response to a North Korean 
missile launch will be highly salient to its citizens; Japan’s general strategy and policy toward 
the Six-Party Talks will not.  
 
Security policy areas that we should expect not to carry great political salience, it follows, 
generally involve long-term or broad security strategy or infrastructure and/or more highly 
technical matters. Examples include Self Defense Force assets and capabilities and most 
developments in U.S.-Japan alliance relations outside of Okinawan basing issues. 
 
In the security policy realm, political salience makes policy more vulnerable to 
unpopularity, criticism, and impeded progress within Japan, which usually constitutes an 
unfavorable outcome in the eyes of the United States as well. This has asymmetrical effects. In 
theory, political salience should magnify whatever success or failure a policy achieves on its 
merits. But in practice, salience usually magnifies failure more than it magnifies success. 
Politicians and governments have little to gain from success and much to lose from security 
policy mistakes. Foreign policy triumphs in Japan, as elsewhere, are much more salient to policy 
elites than to citizens, and “rally round the flag” effects are weak (with the possible exception of 
responses to North Korean or Chinese provocations). Political salience does not provide 
opportunities for public buy-in so much as opportunities for critique. Japanese politicians gain 
little electoral capital from foreign and security policy expertise and accomplishment, as 
evidenced by the small number of politicians who specialize in these areas relative to those who 
concentrate on agriculture, construction, or even finance. To borrow an example offered by 
Epstein and O’Halloran, security policy in a non-polarized but competitive party system may be 
like airline safety: the aim is to prevent failure, and there is little credit to be had when things go 
right.37 Salience may also make failure slightly more likely if politicians falter under the close 
scrutiny it attracts.  
 
Of course, in a vicious cycle, policy failure does also reinforce the salience of the policy 
area. Failure attracts disproportionate media and parliamentary attention.  
 
There are exceptions: Japanese politicians and parties can sometimes achieve political 
success on highly salient foreign and security policy issues. There have been occasional 
triumphs, such as Prime Minister Satou Eisaku’s presiding over the reversion of Okinawa to 
Japanese sovereignty or Prime Minister Koizumi’s visit to North Korea, or successful crisis 
responses such as Operation Tomodachi (again, as opposed to the nuclear reactor component of 
                                                
37 David Epstein and Sharyn O’Halloran, Delegating Powers (Cambridge University Press, 1999). 
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the government’s response), or hardline stances against consensus adversaries, such as Abe 
Shinzou’s against North Korea prior to his becoming prime minister. 
 
Policy initiatives on non-salient issues, in contrast, are less prone to failure (or, indeed, to 
any rousing success). This is in part by definition, as they are largely shielded from public 
scrutiny. Japanese security policymakers are able to proceed without immediate popular 
constraints. It is possible for policies on non-salient issues to fail in less direct ways; they may be 
ill advised for the long term absent any immediate repercussions, or they may be undesirable 
from a U.S. perspective even absent controversy within Japan. But in practice, most DPJ stances 
on non-salient issues have thus far proven favorable to both Japanese and U.S. security policy 
elites. 
 
The DPJ has stumbled on highly salient security policy issues not because of policy 
stances per se, but over competence and process. In their approaches to Futenma and the 
Senkaku incident, DPJ governments have appeared indecisive and unprepared, not out of touch 
with Japanese opinion. Security policy is thus becoming a proxy for competence, but not yet a 
means to distinguish the main parties from each other on policy grounds. This is the case even 
for issues like that have the potential to be controversial “position” issues over which citizens 
disagree about policy ends, such as Okinawan military installations and Constitutional revisions, 
not just for ones that appear to be “valence” issues over which citizens disagree only about 
means to a consensus end, such as disaster relief. This is in part because the DPJ and its 
opposition do not clearly disagree on security issues, but also, and more importantly, because 
citizens prove willing to judge parties’ competence even when they lack well-formed opinions 
on policy. 
 
These patterns imply that higher political salience for security policy issues may be 
undesirable, from the perspectives of both the DPJ itself and the United States. This assumes, of 
course, a narrow goal of policy success, rather than, say, a deepening of Japanese democracy for 
its own sake, in which case more public awareness and political involvement in security affairs 
would be highly desirable. To the DPJ, though, popularization and politicization of security 
policy has proven troublesome. And for the United States, if the DPJ is bogged down on a 
security issue, then the party is failing to make progress on that issue – or, even if inertia is 
preferable to the United States on the issue in question, the DPJ’s limited policymaking 
resources are diverted from more productive use elsewhere. 
 
In turn, the United States should be concerned when it observes previously non-
politically-salient issues being made more salient. This might occur when the DPJ goes out of its 
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way to make an otherwise-obscure security issue more salient, as with its investigation into past 
secret U.S-Japan nuclear agreements; when either the government or opposition attempts to 
politicize a security issue in the context of two-party competition, as with the DPJ’s promise to 
cease the JMSDF’s Indian Ocean refueling operations; or when the United States itself weighs in 





The preceding discussion has centered on the DPJ as a governing party, but it is certainly 
possible that the party will fall from power in the near term. Even if and when this occurs, the 
DPJ is a major and durable contender within Japan’s current party system, one with the potential 
to affect security policy even from the opposition benches. But the party also does face a 
persistent risk – as do Japan’s other parties – of imploding at any point amid further throes of 
party realignment. Even if this occurs (with a likelihood and timing beyond the scope of this 
report), the DPJ’s approach to security policy still offers important lessons on the politics behind 
security policy more generally in Japan, no matter which particular parties find themselves in 
charge. 
 
With this in mind, though, we might distinguish between security policy changes and 
patterns that reflect only current DPJ practice (and are therefore likely to vanish if and when the 
DPJ falls from government), ones that are likely to evolve even as the DPJ remains in power, and 
ones that reflect a more general evolution of Japanese politics and security policy and thus are 
more likely to prove durable in the medium term or beyond. Given the DPJ’s short time in power 
– less than three years – this is somewhat difficult to discern, but we offer brief notes here on 
certain distinctions that can be made even at this early stage. 
 
As long as the DPJ remains in power, its relative inexperience will, of course, persist as 
an influence on security policy outcomes. The DPJ’s youth is partly an artifact of its huge 2009 
Lower House victory, which swept a large number of first-term “freshmen” into office. As such, 
it is likely to be “corrected,” in part, after the party’s inevitable failure in the next election to 
repeat its extraordinary performance (and by the recent departure of many young members 
alongside Ozawa). But it is also a built-in and enduring feature of the party’s evolution. There is 
no way to acquire experienced personnel quickly, short of poaching current LDP members or 
former LDP members currently out of office after having lost the last election. Even if these 
were available to be injected into the DPJ, the DPJ would first have to dislodge its young 
incumbents. Note the distinction here between experience as a professional national politician – 
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even in the opposition – and experience in the broader sense of skills that might be usefully 
applied to a political career. The DPJ might always step up its efforts to recruit candidates 
knowledgeable about security affairs (though it currently shows no signs of doing so), but the 
pool of incumbents (and former incumbents) is finite. 
 
Similarly, the small size of the DPJ’s leadership cadre, coupled with a fairly disorganized 
set of intra-party security policy institutions, is likely to persist. This suggests that the identity of 
particular party leaders and Cabinet ministers is now more important than general politician-
bureaucrat relations when assessing likely security policy developments: individuals have greater 
influence than they did under the LDP, whose policymaking system often outweighed the 
importance of any single individual within it. In one sense, this makes it easier to predict policy, 
as the cadre of influential leaders within the DPJ is knowable and finite; but in another sense, it 
ensures the continued volatility that personality-driven policymaking brings. 
 
 Other elements affecting the DPJ’s approach to security policy are likely to evolve if the 
party remains in power – or, more broadly, if the DPJ remains one of the two poles of a two-
party-competitive party system in Japan, whether in government or opposition. Though the party 
has by no means abandoned its goal of injecting political influence into formerly bureaucratic 
security policymaking, we have observed a certain amount of backtracking from the Hatoyama 
to the Kan and then the Noda administrations, even within the short span of three years. In 
security policy in particular, popularization of policymaking might prove appealing as a 
campaign slogan, but it might not be evolutionarily ideal for the party’s survival. The DPJ, again, 
appears to be learning from its early missteps over Futenma MCAS. We should expect to see at 
least a partial return to reliance on bureaucratic expertise, even if not to the degree practiced 
previously by the LDP. This is in part because bureaucrats themselves may grow more willing 
and able to resist the politicization of security policymaking as time passes. This may also vary 
among different security areas – for example, bureaucrats have already appeared to hold a strong 
position in the process of revising the National Defense Program Guideline (NDPG), as 
discussed in detail below.  
 
But this is also because the DPJ seems to be aware of the salience-failure dynamic and 
seems to be learning to avoid it – even with regard to the Futenma MCAS relocation issue itself, 
though this may have been an unintended result of its earlier missteps. By April 2012, the U.S. 
and Japan had agreed to disaggregate plans to relocate several thousand Marines off Okinawa 
from plans to relocate remaining Futenma MCAS personnel within Okinawa, proceeding with 
the former while remaining inertial on the latter. One might argue that the DPJ’s re-airing of the 
Futenma MCAS relocation issue under Hatoyama helped to illustrate more vividly the 
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intractability of that portion of the two countries’ plans, and thus to convince the countries to at 
least proceed with other, more tractable components.38 
 
More generally, Japanese governments will likely try to redirect their limited political 
resources away from security issues and toward domestic concerns. This dynamic is one that 
applies to all parties in Japan and in many other countries, not the DPJ alone. The LDP learned 
this lesson most recently when voters repudiated former Prime Minister Abe’s focus on foreign 
affairs. The DPJ, meanwhile, finds that “it’s better for us to move ahead quietly when it comes to 
defense policy – if we advertise our progress, the LDP gets serious and lashes back.”39 
 
But governments are unlikely to fully succeed in deemphasizing security concerns. 
Security issues often emerge as unpredictable “exogenous shocks” that inevitably attract media 
and public attention, as seen with the Futenma re-negotiations, the (most recent) Senkakus 
incident, and former Russian President Medvedev’s visit to the Northern Territories. The 
emergence of security as a proxy for competence, combined with the asymmetrical dynamic that 
gives politicians and governments little to gain from success and much to lose from mistakes, 
suggests that security policy, at least in the short term, might serve as a de facto and generic anti-
incumbency force – something similar to the generic “pains of governing” that produce secular-
trend erosion in any government’s public support ratings with each additional month that that 
government serves. Security now occupies a more prominent place among the many policy 
challenges governments must navigate and, inevitably, sometimes stumble upon. This inherent 
anti-incumbency effect of security policy challenges could be particularly hurtful for DPJ, since 
that party has a “shorter leash” with regard to public opinion over security policy competence – 
and because security, unlike economic management or corruption, is one area in which the LDP 
hasn’t come under fire for incompetence. A generic “valence issue” dynamic, in which all 
governments stumble to some degree over security policy challenges, could harden into one in 
which the DPJ, in particular, loses trust over foreign policy, as has tended to be the case for the 
Democratic Party in the United States. 
  
Beyond this, though, the increased salience of security policy issues is unlikely to 
restructure the party system itself in a way that yields a longer-term effect on the direction of 
Japanese security policy. It is also unlikely to go so far as to trigger fundamental party 
realignment by providing a decisive advantage to one of the current two major parties or 
aggravating fissures within one or both parties (this is not to say that fundamental realignment 
                                                
38 Personal interview with Japan Defense Ministry official; Yuki Tatsumi, “The U.S. and Japan Make a 
Good Step Forward, for Now,” PacNet 29 (May 3, 2012). 
39 Personal interview with DPJ staff official. 
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might not occur for reasons other than foreign and security policy – and we might still expect 
security policy to trigger non-realigning party splits more frequently or bring down the 
occasional prime minister, as was the case with Hatoyama for the first time in 50 years in Japan). 
Fundamental policy differences between Japan’s two main parties – and between their 
supporting voters – are much smaller (or at least more obscured) than they were under the 1955 
System. Security concerns are unlikely to provide a new dimension of partisan cleavage or to 
map directly onto pre-existing cleavages. Looking at other countries also gives us little reason to 
expect a partisan security policy cleavage in Japan: the few countries in which we observe 
foreign and security policy to be one of the chief characteristics distinguishing major parties 
from each other (as opposed to economics and/or social issues and/or some form of ethnic 
cleavage) are countries with a clear existential threat, such as South Korea, Taiwan, or Israel. 
Given this, alongside the track record of the DPJ thus far, it seems likely that though new 
governing parties and policymaking practices will continue to inject volatility into the methods 
of Japanese security policymaking, the fundamental direction of that policy, and of the U.S.-
Japan alliance, is likely to remain stable.  
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CASE STUDY: FORMATION OF NATIONAL DEFENSE PROGRAM 
GUIDELINES (NDPG) 
Since 2009, the DPJ has implemented many changes in Japan’s policymaking process, 
many of which were aimed at reducing the influence of the bureaucracy in developing policy. 
Current Prime Minister and DPJ leader Noda has attempted to reverse part of this trend in recent 
times, but how many of the changes will survive the next power transition remains uncertain. 
Some in Japan, particularly those in the media, have been critical of Noda’s decisions, describing 
them as stepping back to the way business was conducted under LDP rule. 
 
Regardless of how long the DPJ may stay in power, one seemingly irreversible trend has 
emerged in Japan’s policymaking process: the intention on the part of most politicians to depend 
less on the bureaucracy for policy input. Indeed, calls for “politicians’ leadership” (seiji shudo) 
had already been made under the LDP government. Some argue that the trend toward 
“politicians’ leadership” was originally set by the reorganization of government ministries based 
on the Basic Law to Reform Central Ministries and Other Agencies (Chuo Shouchou Tou 
Kaikaku Kihon Ho) enacted under Prime Minister Hashimoto Ryutaro in June 1998. In more 
recent years, LDP Prime Minister Abe Shinzou sought to enhance policymaking capacity among 
the prime minister’s staff by increasing the number of special assistants to the prime minister 
(shusho hosakan) and seeking to establish a Japanese-style national security council. While these 
efforts did not bear fruit during his short tenure in the office (Abe resigned after only one year), 
the DPJ has repeated, and in some case enhanced, these efforts since taking power in September 
2009. 
 
As noted above, the full impact of the legal, administrative, and institutional changes 
made by the DPJ to expand the authority of politicians to engage in policymaking processes is 
yet to be determined, and it is difficult to precisely assess how the recent changes under the DPJ 
will impact Japan’s security policy making in the long run. However, a comparison of the 
processes under which the National Defense Program Guidelines (NDPG) – Japan’s core mid-
term security policy document – has been shaped under the LDP and the DPJ can provide some 
sense of how these changes, particularly the increased role of politicians in policymaking 
processes, may affect Japan’s future security policy making. 
 
The case study that follows, therefore, aims to compare the processes by which the 
Japanese government revised the National Defense Program Guidelines in 2004 and 2010. The 
2004 NDPG revision took place under LDP rule with Koizumi Jun’ichirou as the prime minister, 
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whereas the 2010 revision took place under the watch of then-Prime Minister Kan of the DPJ.40 
This case study attempts to identify the following: 
 
• What are the main differences between the 2004 and 2010 NDPG revisions? 
• Did differences emerge as the result of changes in policymaking processes under the 
DPJ? 
• Did policymaking process differences lead to changes in the contents of the NDPG that 
would not have happened otherwise? 
 
After analysis on these three points, we conclude with an interim assessment of how the 
NDPG illustrates ways in which changes in policymaking processes, particularly the increased 
role of politicians therein, may affect Japan’s security policy making in the future. 
Background: What Are the National Defense Program Guidelines? 
 
The National Defense Program Guidelines (Bouei Keikaku no Taikou)41 were produced 
for the first time in 1976. The purpose of the NDPG is to establish the basic principles and goals 
of Japan’s defense policy, define the defense capability necessary to realize these goals, and 
thereby set priorities for defense acquisition. 
 
Originally, the NDPG was supposed to be announced in 1957 when the Japanese 
government issued the Basic Principles of National Defense (Kokubou no Kihon Hoshin). 
However, the political environment at that time prevented it: during the 1950s, strong 
disagreement existed over the fundamentals of Japan’s defense policy, such as the 
constitutionality of the SDF (whether the SDF could be considered as “war potential” [senryoku] 
that Article Nine of the Japanese Constitution prohibits Japan from possessing, for example), and 
therefore it was politically impossible for the Japanese government to issue the NDPG, which 
could be interpreted as a plan to rebuild Japan’s military capability. Instead, Japan’s government 
decided to allow its defense capability build-up to begin based on a series of five-year defense 
plans. 
 
                                                
40 The revision process began in 2009 with Hatoyama as the prime minister, but Kan had succeeded him 
by the time the revision was completed in December 2010. 
41 When it was originally announced, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA) gave the document the English 
title “National Defense Program Outline.” When the 2004 revision took place, the JDA changed the 
English translation to “National Defense Program Guidelines” (NDPG). Given that the Japanese title of 
the document has never changed, the English translation of NDPG will be used throughout this report to 
avoid confusion. 
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As Japan’s economy began to grow in the 1960s, the country’s defense budget steadily 
increased. By the late 1960s, there was growing concern that Japan’s defense build-up was 
taking place without any policy guidance. Concern emerged regarding how much defense 
spending was appropriate for Tokyo to maintain the level of defense capabilities that are 
permissible within the constitution. It was under these circumstances that the NDPG was created. 
While the document has essentially been a policy document for the Ministry of Defense (MOD) 
and its non-ministerial predecessor, the Japan Defense Agency (JDA), Cabinet approval is 
required. 
 
When first released in 1976, the NDPG was designed to provide the basic principles of 
defense policy for the next ten or so years. Despite this original intention, the first NDPG 
revision did not take place until 1995, well after the Cold War had ended. As the first NDPG 
revision unfolded, however, an advisory group report published in the process attracted a great 
deal of attention among alliance managers in the United States. The Advisory Group on Defense 
Issues (Bouei Mondai Kondan-kai), better known as the Higuchi Commission, was convened by 
then-Prime Minister Hosokawa Morihiro, Japan’s first non-LDP prime minister in decades, in 
February 1994. After a total of twenty meetings in six months, the Council submitted its final 
report, The Modality of the Security and Defense Capabilities of Japan: Outlook for the 21st 
Century, to Prime Minister Murayama Tomiichi on August 12, 1994.42 Released in the midst of 
U.S.-Japan tension over bilateral trade imbalances, the Higuchi Commission Report provoked 
concerns among alliance managers that Tokyo might be drifting away from the U.S.-Japan 
alliance, as it appeared to place greater emphasis on multinational security cooperation than on 
cooperation with Washington. However, the revised NDPG, approved by the Murayama cabinet 
on November 28, 1995 after more than a year of deliberation, alleviated such concerns by 
proposing that the U.S.-Japan alliance remained indispensable for Japan’s security, while also 
noting the fundamental change in international security environment in post-Cold War world.43 
 
Although it is a document that aims to guide Japan’s defense policy in the medium term, 
the NDPG has also functioned as a trigger for reaffirming and/or redefining the U.S.-Japan 
alliance. The NDPG’s first revision in 1995 served as one of the driving forces behind the two 
countries’ efforts to reaffirm and redefine the U.S.-Japan alliance in the post-Cold War era.44 The 
revision in 2004 became an important consideration when the United States and Japan engaged 
                                                
42 Advisory Group on Defense Issues, The Modality of the Security and Defense Capabilities of Japan: 
Outlook for the 21st Century, August 12, 1994, http://www.ioc.u-tokyo.ac.jp/~worldjpn/ 
documents/texts/JPSC/19940812.O1J.html 
43 Heisei 8-nendo ikou ni Kakawaru Bouei Keikaku no Taikou ni tsuite [The National Defense 
Program Outlines for FY 1996 and After], November 28, 1995, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ 
ampobouei/sankou/951128taikou.html. 
44 Yoichi Funabashi, Alliance Adrift (Council on Foreign Relations Press, 1999). 
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in discussions toward a new vision for the U.S.-Japan alliance under the Defense Policy Review 
Initiative (DPRI). The NDPG review in December 2010 also informed discussions among 
alliance managers in both countries as they tried to articulate how the United States and Japan 
should deepen their relationship. Their discussion culminated in the Security Consultative 
Committee (more commonly known as the “2 plus 2” meeting between the two countries’ 
foreign and defense ministers) Joint Statement issued in June 2011. As such, a great deal of 
attention has been paid to the NDPG as the official document that sheds light on Japan’s security 
policy priorities. Similarly, the report by the advisory group on defense and security issues 
convened by the prime minister has also begun to attract attention as an unofficial preview of the 
NDPG. 
 
The NDPG consists of two parts. The first is a narrative in which Japanese perception of 
the regional security situation, the core principles of Japan’s security policy, and the basic 
organizing principles of SDF force posture are described. The second part is called the “Annex” 
(beppyo) and includes the number of personnel in each of the three SDF services and the list of 
major equipment that the SDF is expected to acquire. The Annex is closely linked to the Mid-
Term Defense Program, a 5-year defense acquisition plan. 
The 2004 NDPG Revision 
 
Japan revised its NDPG for the second time in 2004. The 2004 NDPG was announced on 
December 10, 2004, upon approval by the Cabinet led by LDP Prime Minister Koizumi. The 
2004 revision distinguishes itself from the original NDPG in 1976 and the 1995 NDPG on two 
accounts: the introduction of the concept of a “multi-functional, flexible, and effective defense 
force” (takinou de danryoku-teki na jikkousei no aru boueiryoku) and the reference to the 
necessity of revisiting the “Basic Defense Capability Concept” (kibanteki boueiryoku) that 
served as one of the fundamentals of postwar Japanese defense policy.45	  
 
The report attracted significant attention from the international community because it was 
the first NDPG revision after the September 11th terrorist attacks against the United States in 
2001. Japan had sent oil tankers to the Indian Ocean in November 2001 in support of Operation 
Enduring Freedom and dispatched the Japan Air Self-Defense Force (JASDF) and Ground Self-
Defense Force (JGSDF) to support Operation Iraqi Freedom in January 2002. When the Japanese 
government began to revise the NDPG in 2004, there was a rising expectation that the revision 
might result in a major change in Japan’s defense policy. 
 
                                                
45 Ministry of Defense of Japan, Heisei 17-nendo Bouei Hakusho [Defense of Japan 2005], 91-93. 
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The December 2003 Cabinet Decision announcing Japan’s decision regarding the 
introduction of ballistic missile defense (BMD) served as the official trigger for the NDPG 
revision in 2004. Following the December 2003 Cabinet Decision, the formal revision process 
was launched in April 2003 when the prime minister appointed the Council on Security and 
Defense Capability, more commonly referred to as the Araki Commission. The Araki 
Commission submitted its final report to the prime minister six months later on October 4, 2004. 
The report attracted considerable attention for suggesting the new concept of tougouteki anzen 
hosho senryaku (Integrated Security Strategy); questioning the validity of kibanteki boueiryoku 
kousou (Basic Defense Capability Concept), which had been one of Japan’s fundamental defense 
principles; and even discussing the need for constitutional revision in its Annex.46	  
 
Following the Araki Commission Report, NDPG revision discussions within the Japanese 
government began in earnest on October 21, 2004. A total of six rounds of discussions were 
held before the 2004 NDPG was released upon the cabinet’s approval on December 10, 2004.47 
Following the Araki Commission Report closely, the 2004 NDPG announced that Japan’s 
primary security policy goals would be (1) the defense of Japan and (2) improving the 
international security environment, and that it would seek to develop “multi-functional, flexible, 
and effective” defense capabilities to support these goals. As with the 1994 NDPG, it articulated 
a belief in the “indispensable” nature of the U.S.-Japan alliance. In addition, it explicitly 
acknowledged for the first time that Japan would rely on U.S. nuclear deterrence to counter 
nuclear-armed states and nuclear threats.48	  
 
Although the formal process of the 2004 NDPG revision did not begin until January 
2004, the preparation that ultimately led to the Cabinet Decision in December 2003 began more 
than two years prior. In September 2001, shortly after the September 11th terrorist attacks 
against the United States, the JDA launched an internal discussion group labeled the Meeting to 
Examine the Modality of Defense Capability (Bouei-ryoku no arikata kentou kaigi, better known 
as Arikata Kentou for short). The 2005 Defense White Paper described the efforts of the Arikata 
Kentou as playing an important role in shaping the new NDPG through its deliberations on the 
global security environment, the role of the new defense capabilities and concepts, and the 
                                                
46 The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities, The Council on Security and Defense Capabilities 
Report: Japan’s Visions for Future Security and Defense Capabilities, October 4, 2004, 
http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/singi/ampobouei/dai13/13siryou.pdf. 
47 Ministry of Defense of Japan, Heisei 17-nendo Bouei Hakusho [Defense of Japan 2005], 88-90.  
48 Heisei 17-nendo ikou ni kakawaru Bouei Keikaku no Taikou ni tsuite [The National Defense Program 
Guidelines for FY 2005 and After], December 10, 2004, http://www.kantei.go.jp/jp/ 
kakugikettei/2004/1210taikou.html. 
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necessity of jointness among the three Self-Defense Forces (SDF) services and their new force 
posture.49	  
 
More importantly, as discussed below, the December 2003 Cabinet Decision is 
considered within the MOD as largely responsible for pre-determining the content of the 2004 
NDPG. As noted above, the primary purpose of the December 2003 Cabinet Decision was to 
announce Tokyo’s decision to introduce BMD and explicitly direct the Japanese government to 
revise the NDPG and the Mid-Term Defense Program (MTDP). Its critical salience was in the 
parts of the decision that did not attract much media attention, however. The December 2003 
Cabinet Decision included a very detailed description of what Japan’s future posture should be 
and how it should accommodate BMD.50 Thus, the rest of the process was regarded, by and 
large, as confirming and justifying the December 2003 Cabinet Decision. 
 
During the revision, there were two ways in which politicians from the ruling parties – 
the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and Koumeitou (Clean Government Party) – engaged in the 
discussions. 51 One was an effort by the LDP’s Committee on National Defense. Following the 
December 2003 decision to introduce BMD, the LDP’s Committee on National Defense began a 
discussion on Japan’s future defense posture. This discussion culminated in the report Teigen: 
Atarashii Nihon no Bouei Seisaku (Recommendations: Japan’s New Defense Policy), which was 
issued on March 30, 2004. A senior MOD official who was detailed to the Office of National 
Security and Crisis Management in the Cabinet Secretariat at the time recalls that this report 
heavily influenced the discussion in the Araki Commission. He also stated that the Araki 
Commission incorporated many recommendations that were proposed by the LDP report.52 
 
In addition, the LDP and Koumeitou launched the Yotou Project Team (Yotou PT, or 
Ruling Parties Project Team) in the summer of 2004. The Yotou PT continued its discussion 
until only a few days prior to December 10, when the Japanese government approved and 
announced the 2004 NDPG. According to one Koumeitou member of the Yotou PT, the Yotou 
PT was formed to examine all important policy issues, including the NDPG revision, and the 
Yotou PT began to meet frequently on the NDPG revision following the release of the Araki 
Commission’s Final Report on October 4, 2004. In the Yotou PT discussions, senior officials 
                                                
49 Ministry of Defense of Japan, Heisei 17 nen-do Bouei Hakusho [Defense of Japan], 89. 
50 Government of Japan, Dandou Misairu Bouei Shisutemu no Seibi-nado ni tsuite [In Regards to the 
Introduction of Ballistic Missile Defense System, etc.] Kakugi Kettei [Cabinet Decision], December 19, 
2003. 
51 Koumeitou (Clean Government Party) is a political party whose support base is almost entirely drawn 
from Souka Gakkai, a Buddhist sect. 
52 Personal interview with a MOD official, Tokyo, Japan, December 22, 2010. 
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(usually at the director-general level, and at a minimum at the division director level) from the 
relevant agencies – the Ministry of Finance; Ministry of Economy, Trade, and Industry (METI); 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MOFA); and JDA – were often invited to brief on various issues. 
“We left no important issues unexamined, and our final recommendations were cleared by the 
official decision-making process in [the] LDP and Komeitou [coalition] before being submitted 
to the government,” both Komeitou and LDP members of the Yotou PT recalled. “The main 
purpose of our discussion was to offer a set of overall guiding principles for the NDPG revision. 
We didn't get involved in the details of NDPG such as the exact wording of the final 
document.”53 
 
The feeling prevails that the 2004 NDPG revision was not conducted properly. Many 
MOD officials and JSDF officers interviewed for this report still question whether it was 
appropriate to use the December 2003 Cabinet Decision to introduce BMD as a trigger for 
revising the NDPG. For instance, a senior MOD official suggested that the MOD had not 
planned on revising the NDPG when the December 2003 Cabinet Decision was announced. “We 
thought we would be able to introduce BMD without revising the NDPG,” another senior MOD 
official said. This official suggested that it was then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuda Yasuo who 
decided that the introduction of BMD should be implemented in the broader context of revising 
and readjusting Japan’s defense posture.54	  
 
Furthermore, many in the MOD and the Office of National Security and Crisis 
Management in the Cabinet Secretariat suggest that the introduction of BMD itself was by and 
large “forced upon the MOD” by then-Defense Minister Ishiba Shigeru, who promised then-U.S. 
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld that Japan would introduce BMD under his watch.55	  
MOD and SDF officials express particular frustration that the December 2003 Cabinet Decision 
essentially pre-determined the context of the 2004 NDPG before the revision process actually 
began. “The NDPG was revised in 2004 in order to create a space for BMD in Japan’s defense,” 
a senior SDF officer said. “That is why we call the 2004 NDPG ‘BMD Taiko’ (BMD NDPG).”56	  
 
One can argue, therefore, that the 2004 NDPG, despite the prevailing perception that it 
was very much driven by the bureaucracy, involved a fair degree of engagement by political 
leaders. Still, much of the substance of the 2004 NDPG was worked out among bureaucrats in 
the MOD and Cabinet Secretariat without any intimate interaction with political leaders. A senior 
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MOD official described the division of roles in drafting the 2004 NDPG as follows: “The 
Cabinet Secretariat wrote the main text of the 2004 NDPG. The MOD worked on the Annex that 
describes the force structure sought under the 2004 NDPG.”57 It is worthwhile to note that 
government officials involved in the NDPG revision in 2004 considered the revision process to 
be a “closed” one, with little anticipation of feedback from outside. For example, a senior MOD 
official who was seconded to the Cabinet Secretariat at the time of the NDPG revision in 2004 
confessed that he and everyone else in the Cabinet Secretariat involved in the NDPG revision 
“did not think about getting outside experts’ input for the NDPG revision.” “At maximum, we 
thought it would be sufficient to get feedback from outside experts once the Cabinet Secretariat 
had a complete draft to circulate. But then the Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary insisted on 
involving non-government experts. His suggestion prevailed, and the Council on Security and 
Defense Capabilities (Araki Commission) was convened.”58 
 
LDP and Koumeitou politicians seem to have taken a two-step approach in their 
engagement in the revision of NDPG in 2004. At first, they tried to engage in the very beginning 
of the revision process. This was particularly the case when the LDP Committee on National 
Defense issued its recommendation for the NDPG revision in its March 2004 report. However, 
once government officials began to draft the 2004 NDPG following the Araki Commission 
Report, LDP and Koumeitou politicians did not involve themselves in the details. Rather, by 
having a parallel discussion on the NDPG in the Yotou PT until several days before the 2004 
NDPG was approved by the Koizumi Cabinet, they functioned more as a sounding board for 
government officials, providing them with feedback on what would be politically acceptable, 
rather than debating with bureaucrats over the content of the NDPG for its own sake. 
The 2010 NDPG Revision 
 
The most recent NDPG revision took place in 2010. However, this revision occurred 
under very different political circumstances, as this was the first revision to take place under the 
leadership of the DPJ rather than the historically dominant LDP. 
 
The 2010 NDPG revision was a politically charged process from the very beginning. The 
2004 NDPG stipulated that it should be revised in five years. Following such guidance, the MOD 
had begun preparatory efforts to revise the NDPG in 2008 by launching a new cycle of arikata 
kentou kai (Defense Council for Defense Posture Review). The Council on Security and 
Defense Capabilities (more commonly known as the Katsumata Commission) was also convened 
by then-Prime Minister Aso Tarou in January 2009. After eleven meetings, the Council 
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submitted its final report to Prime Minister Aso on August 4, 2009. At the time, it was expected 
that the Council’s report would inform the planned revision of the NDPG, to occur by the end of 
2009. However, the LDP’s loss in the general election in August 2009 and the transfer of 
governing power to the DPJ suspended the revision effort. Despite initial signs that the NDPG 
revision might proceed as planned, the Japanese government under then-Prime Minister 
Hatoyama Yukio decided in mid-November 2009 to postpone the revision by one year. The 
decision was officially announced one month later in the form of Cabinet Decision Heisei 22-
nendo no bouei-ryoku seibi sonota ni kansuru kakugi kettei (Cabinet Decision in regard to the 
FY 2010 Build-Up of Defense Capabilities, Etc.).59	  
 
The formal NDPG revision process under the new DPJ government proceeded in a way 
that was very similar to the revisions in 1995 and 2004 under the LDP government. It began with 
the appointment of the Council on Security and Defense Capabilities in the New Era (known as 
the Sato Commission) in February 2010, which issued its final report in August 2010 after six 
months of deliberation. Council members met for formal meetings nine times. In addition, they 
met for fourteen informal “study sessions” (benkyokai), to which officials from the MOD and 
MOFA as well as non-government issue experts were invited to brief the Council members. As 
discussed below, this was a different process than the deliberations of the Higuchi and Araki 
Commissions. 
 
The Sato Commission submitted its final report to Prime Minister Kan on August 27, 
2010. Entitled Japan’s Vision for Future Security and Defense Capabilities for the New Era: 
Toward a Peace-Creating Nation, the report identified three security policy objectives: Japan’s 
own security and prosperity, the peace and stability of the international security environment, 
and the maintenance of a free and open international system. The report proposed that, through 
efforts to achieve these security goals, Japan should seek its identity as a “heiwa souzou kokka” 
(peace-creating nation) that would proactively engage in global efforts for peace and security. 
Although the report did not advocate a security policy drastically different from that laid out in 
the 2004 NDPG, the Sato Commission report attracted particular attention for explicitly 
declaring that the Basic Defense Capability Concept has “lost its validity” and for advocating the 
establishment of new principles for arms exports and defense cooperation.60	  
	  
Following the submission of the Council’s final report, deliberation within the Japanese 
government – the MOD and Cabinet Secretariat, in particular – picked up speed. The revised 
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NDPG was approved by the Kan cabinet on December 17, 2010. Incorporating the proposition 
put forward by the Sato Commission that the Basic Defense Force Concept is no longer valid, 
the 2010 NDPG introduced the concept of douteki boueiryoku (dynamic defense), which focuses 
on deterring threats by developing defense capabilities that have high readiness and are agile, 
flexible, sustainable, and multi-purpose. The 2010 NDPG also declared that Japan will shift its 
defense focus from its northern region (where it had prepare for a land invasion by the Soviet 
Union) to the southwestern island chain.61	  
 
DPJ politicians were actively engaged throughout the NDPG revision process in 2010. 
They used several methods to involve themselves in the process. First was the effort to engage 
officials within the MOD in discussions on defense needs. In January 2010, then-Parliamentary 
Vice-Minister of Defense Nagashima Akihisa convened a study group with an eye toward NDPG 
revision. In these study group sessions, MOD senior officials and SDF officers would brief 
Nagashima and his fellow Parliamentary Vice-Minister of Defense Kusuda Taizo. The study 
group for the two parliamentary vice-ministers continued until Nagashima and Kusuda left the 
MOD due to the change of prime minister from Yukio Hatoyama to Naoto Kan in May 2010.62	  
 
DPJ politicians also attempted to engage in the revision process through study groups 
convened by parliamentary committees and through discussion within the DPJ. Their 
engagement through these routes was constrained in the beginning, however, due to several 
decisions made by Prime Minister Hatoyama. Soon after becoming prime minister, Hatoyama 
ordered in September 2009 that the Policy Affairs Research Council (PARC) in the DPJ be 
eliminated so that policymaking authority would be unified under the Cabinet.63 In this context, 
Hatoyama and the DPJ leadership also prohibited parliamentary committees from holding study 
groups on policy issues and from interacting with bureaucrats. This effectively prohibited DPJ 
politicians from engaging in policy discussion independent of the Cabinet.64	  
 
However, Hatoyama and the DPJ leadership began to relax these rules in January 2010. 
First, they permitted DPJ members to receive briefings from government officials within 
parliamentary committees. This decision prompted engagement in the revision process by DPJ 
politicians who were the members of the Committee on National Security Affairs in the House of 
Representatives (Lower House) and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense in 
the House of Councillors. These two committees convened an informal study group in January 
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2010 to examine Bouei Nihou (Two National Defense Laws: the Self-Defense Forces Law and 
the Ministry of Defense Establishment Law) and began to invite MOD officials for briefings on 
Japan’s national defense policy in general. When the DPJ leadership relaxed the rule further to 
allow the chairmen and majority whips of parliamentary committees to host study groups, the 
chairmen and majority whips of the Committee on National Security Affairs in the Lower House 
and the Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Defense in the Upper House began to 
convene weekly study group meetings focused on the NDPG revisions.65	  
 
Following the resignation of Hatoyama in May 2010, the DPJ leadership under Prime 
Minister Kan and Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku Yoshito decided to reinstate the PARC 
within the DPJ. In addition, DPJ leadership under Kan and Sengoku decided to reinstate bumon 
kaigi (Policy Department Meetings) within the DPJ. Following this decision, the weekly study 
group on the NDPG hosted by the parliamentary committees expanded to include the members 
of the Foreign Affairs and National Security Policy Departments. The expanded study group on 
the NDPG was co-hosted by the majority whip of the parliamentary committees and the head of 
the DPJ’s Foreign Affairs and National Security Departments.66	  
 
In addition, parallel to this study group, a separate study group on the NDPG was 
established in the DPJ’s Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security within 
the PARC. The Committee was chaired by Nakagawa Masaharu, but Nagashima Akihisa 
(parliamentary vice-defense minister in the Hatoyama cabinet) and Kira Shuji (parliamentary 
vice-minister for foreign affairs in the Hatoyama cabinet) were in charge of the day-to-day 
management of the study group. After five months of intensive discussions, the Research 
Committee on Foreign Affairs issued a set of recommendations for the new NDPG on November 
30, 2010.67	  
 
Finally, DPJ politicians engaged in the revision of the NDPG through the Yon Daijin 
Kaigou (Four Ministers Meeting) and Anzen Hosho Kaigi (Security Council of Japan).68 The 
chief cabinet secretary, defense minister, foreign minister, and finance minister were the core 
                                                
65 Ibid. 
66 Ibid. 
67 Personal interview with a DPJ politician, Tokyo, Japan, February 9, 2011. 
68 The Anzen Hosho Kaigi [Security Council of Japan] was established in 1986 as a meeting to address 
issues critically important for the national defense of Japan. It is chaired by the Prime Minister and 
includes the Minister of Internal Affairs and Communications; the Minister of Foreign Affairs; the 
Minister of Economy, Trade and Industry; the Minister of Finance; the Minister of Land Infrastructure 
and Transportation; the Minister of Defense; the Chief Cabinet Secretary; the Chairman of Public Safety 
Commission; and whoever else the Prime Minister deems appropriate. Anzen Hosho Kaigi Secchi-ho 
[The Law to Establish the Security Council of Japan], enacted May 27, 1986, last revised December 22, 
2006. http://www.cas.go.jp/jp/hourei/houritu/anpo_h.html. 
 41 
participants in this meeting. They were often joined by two deputy chief cabinet secretaries, the 
deputy defense minister, and the assistant chief cabinet secretary for National Security and Crisis 
Management. This meeting began at the initiative of then-Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku. 
The four cabinet-level officials met seven times between May 2010 (when Kan succeeded 
Hatoyama as prime minister and Sengoku succeeded Hirano as chief cabinet secretary) and 
December 2010 when the revised NDPG was announced. In addition, the cabinet-level Anzen 
Hosho Kaigi (more commonly referred to as Anpo Kaigi) met nine-times to discuss matters 
related to NDPG revision. According to a MOD official interviewed for the project, these 
meetings were convened either early in the morning or late in the evening on weekdays, as well 
as on weekends “to accommodate Sengoku’s schedule… he really wanted to attend all the 
meetings.”69	  
 
What was unique about the Yon Daijin Kaigou was that Chief Cabinet Secretary 
Sengoku, who chaired the meeting, was supported by a team of scholars and non-government 
policy experts convened at his request. Known as the “Support Group,” the team was headed by 
Kitaoka Shinichi, a professor of political science at University of Tokyo, and included 
Lieutenant General Yamaguchi Noboru (retired, JGSDF), Michishita Narushige of the Graduate 
Research Institute of Policy Studies, and Jimbo Ken of Keio University.70 The group provided 
information to Sengoku throughout the NDPG revision and even prepared its own draft NDPG 
and submitted it to Sengoku at the end of November 2010. 
 
As a result, when the Yon Daijin Kaigou met for the last time on December 3, 2010, three 
competing drafts for the 2010 NDPG – the draft submitted by the government officials, the draft 
prepared by the “Support Group,” and a hybrid draft of the two born from negotiation between 
MOD/Cabinet Secretarial officials and Deputy Chief Cabinet Secretary Fukuyama Tetsuro – 
were put before the four cabinet ministers for consideration.71	  
 
The minutes of the meeting demonstrate that the DPJ legislators at the meeting – Foreign 
Minister Maehara, Defense Minister Kitazawa, Finance Minister Noda, Deputy Chief Cabinet 
Secretary Fukuyama, Deputy Defense Minister Azumi, and former Parliamentary Vice-Minister 
of Defense Nagashima (who played the role of moderator for the meeting) – debated not only the 
content of the revised NDPG, but also the wording of the document. For instance, the meeting 
minutes show considerable disagreement between the defense minister and deputy defense 
minister, on one side, and the foreign minister and deputy chief cabinet secretary, on the other, 
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over whether the recommendation to create a Japanese-style National Security Council (NSC) 
should be included in the revised NDPG, and, if so, in what way.72 
Differences Between the Two Revisions 
 
When examining the NDPG revision processes under the LDP and DPJ, two main 
differences can be identified. First is the way in which politicians engaged in policy discussion. 
In the 2004 revision under the rule of the LDP-Koumeitou coalition, interested politicians 
engaged with the process in a structured manner. The timing of their engagement was 
concentrated at the very beginning of the process (in the period leading up to the announcement 
of the LDP Committee on National Defense Report in March 2004) and the final several months 
of the revision (Yotou PT). Their routes of participating in the discussion were also limited. In 
the 2010 revision, interested DPJ politicians engaged in discussions throughout the revision 
process, with participation intensifying in the final several months of the revision. The routes 
through which they took part in the discussion were also more varied. 
 
Second, the nature of participation varied. In the 2004 NDPG revision, politicians played 
the role of setting politically acceptable parameters for the new NDPG. They also played a role 
in facilitating communication between the government and the ruling parties so that the LDP and 
Koumeitou, as ruling parties, did not explicitly disagree with the NDPG as an official 
government document. In the case of the 2010 NDPG revision, however, DPJ politicians 
engaged in revision discussions in a more competitive manner. That the Research Committee on 
Foreign Affairs and National Security within the DPJ’s PARC submitted its own 
recommendations for the NDPG at the end of November, when the government was already 
finalizing its own NDPG draft, was one indicator of the competitive nature of the party’s 
engagement. Sengoku’s utilization of his “Support Group” as a parallel to Yon Daijin Kaigo is 
another such indicator (no such group played any role in the 2004 NDPG revision). Finally, the 
minutes of the last Yon Daijin Kaigo demonstrate that DPJ politicians were in competition with 
the bureaucracy not only over substance but also over such details as phrasing. 
 
Evaluations of the role of the politicians in the NDPG revision in 2004 and 2010 vary 
considerably. In general (and understandably), politicians tend to be positive about the role 
played by politicians when their own political party controls the government. DPJ politicians are 
dismissive of the role played by LDP and Koumeitou politicians in the 2004 NDPG revision 
process. They describe the 2004 revision process as “completely controlled by the 
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bureaucrats.”73 “Our cabinet ministers met seven times to specifically discuss the NDPG. I bet 
the LDP and Koumeitou cabinet ministers never met that often,” a DPJ politician challenged.74	  
 
But LDP and Koumeitou politicians, who were involved in the 2004 NDPG revision, 
disagree. “The Yotou PT for the NDPG revision may have been active only for several months, 
but we were very much involved,” one Koumeitou Yotou PT member asserts. “Back then, the 
MOD and the Ministry of Finance had a serious disagreement over the personnel level of the 
Ground Self-Defense Force. In order to reconcile the difference between the two ministries, our 
PT met every other day toward the end of the revision period.”75 In turn, they argue that theirs is 
the more appropriate way to exercise seiji shudo (politicians’ leadership). “Our job as politicians 
is to provide overall guidance and make sure to provide clear and politically-permissible 
parameters for the bureaucrats and others who discuss the details of the NDPG, or for any 
important policy issues, for that matter,” one former LDP defense minister insists. “Intervening 
on how the document should be phrased, for instance, is the area where we, as politicians, do not 
have to get involved. Suppose the government works like a corporation. A politician’s job is that 
of the Chief Executive Officer, or the Board of Directors. No corporation has a CEO who gets 
involved in the negotiation of every single business contract that his or her corporation enters, 
nor does he or she calculate the corporation’s profit margins him or herself. That is the job of the 
employees, or the bureaucrats in the case of the government.”76	  
 
One Koumeitou politician agrees: “We need to have the confidence of the bureaucracy 
that we would not meddle with what is supposed to be their job… In the Yotou PT discussion for 
the 2004 NDPG, the members of the PT had very tense exchanges with the government officials 
at times. We challenged their arguments and pushed them for clarification until we felt 
convinced. But it never occurred to us that we would give them our own draft of the NDPG, for 
example.”77	  “It is silly to think that we can compete with the bureaucracy,” says another 
Koumeitou politician. “Whether you like it or not, it is a reality that the bureaucracy functions as 
the biggest think tank for the Japanese government. We have to work with them.”78  
 
When it comes to the 2010 NDPG revision, DPJ politicians applaud the role of the 
politicians in the process. Dismissing the 2004 NDPG revision as “controlled by bureaucrats for 
the most part,”40 they appear more or less content with their level of engagement. “The 
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bureaucrats were very nervous this time, because they were not able to control our discussion at 
Yon Daijin Kaigou or the DPJ Research Committee on National Security,” several DPJ 
politicians suggest.79	  Interestingly, some bureaucrats agree with this proposition. For instance, 
one Cabinet Secretariat official allows that seiji shudo was “positively exercised” during the 
2010 NDPG revision process. “The 2004 NDPG, because the main text was primarily prepared 
by the Cabinet Secretariat and the Annex was primarily worked out by the Ministry of Defense, 
did not read like one coherent document. The 2010 NDPG does not have that problem much,” 
he said. “It really helped that the ministers who were the principal members of Yon Daijin 
Kaigou – Chief Cabinet Secretary Sengoku, Defense Minister Kitazawa, Foreign Minister 
Maehara, and Finance Minister Noda – all had serious interest in the security issues. They 
discussed every aspect of the NDPG, both main text and Annex, at the Yon Daijin Kaigou, which 
helped to make the NDPG a better packaged document.”80	  
 
Others disagree. In particular, LDP and Koumeitou politicians and many government 
officials criticize the “lack of transparency” and “unclear decision-making process within the 
DPJ” in the 2010 NDPG revision. “I have no idea how the DPJ makes decisions on policy 
issues,” one LDP politician remarked.81 “The DPJ has the PARC, but do their recommendations 
mean anything?” asked one Koumeitou politician.82	  
 
Further, they criticize the DPJ’s anti-bureaucracy approach to policymaking. “The DPJ’s 
emphasis on seiji shudo alone shows their shallowness,” one senior LDP politician argued. “We 
members of the Diet, as elected officials, have always been ultimately responsible for the 
decision that Japan makes as a country. That means each one of us, regardless of whether you 
are in the ruling party or opposition, is accountable for the decisions made by the Japanese 
government. The public sent us to the Diet to supervise the bureaucrats, so that they can optimize 
their potential in conducting their day-to-day management of the country — our job is not to 
compete with them.”83	  
 
Many government officials are also critical of the DPJ’s style of engagement in the 
discussion of the NDPG revision. They were particularly critical of the role played by the 
“Support Group,” criticizing the DPJ for its undefined relationship with non-government 
intellectuals. For instance, one MOD official comments that the Support Group’s “insertion” of 
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their own NDPG draft made the revision process “unnecessarily confusing.”84 Another MOD 
official describes the role of the Support Group as “kind of like an alibi to show that the DPJ was 
not controlled by the bureaucrats like the LDP.”85 MOD and Cabinet Secretariat officials seem to 
agree that the significance of the Support Group was as a symbol of independent thinking and 
not in the substance it provided to the NDPG – but they also pointed out that utilizing non-
government intellectuals in such a manner is unique to the DPJ.86	  
 
What causes these differences? Many government officials (and some LDP politicians, 
too) point to structural differences between the LDP (and Koumeitou) and DPJ as the primary 
reason, as discussed above. Specifically, both senior LDP and Koumeitou politicians and senior 
bureaucrats point to the lack of a clear decision-making process within the DPJ. “In the LDP and 
Koumeitou, we have a certain decision-making process that everyone accepts, and the decisions 
that are made according to the process are considered to reflect the will of our parties as a whole. 
That is not the case with the DPJ,” they explain. “Take the report put forward by their Research 
Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security, for example. That report does not carry any 
political weight within the DPJ, because there is no established decision-making system within 
the DPJ. So that report, no matter how much media attention it receives, is just the report of the 
Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security, and it does not reflect the DPJ’s 
stance on national security policy.”87	  
 
In regards to the structure difference between the LDP/Koumeitou and DPJ, a MOD 
official also identifies the “demographic” difference that a large number of DPJ politicians are 
currently only serving their first or second terms in office. “In today’s DPJ, the majority of its 
Diet members act as if they are small business owners. That is, they are only thinking about their 
own career advancement. In the LDP, and in Koumeitou to a large degree, due to the established 
hierarchy based on seniority, politicians have to spend at least some time playing a role of 
invisible quiet facilitator in intra-party business as they acquire knowledge and expertise in 
certain policy areas. By the time they move up the ladder within the party and start playing more 
visible roles, they already have a level of credibility within the party. The DPJ has no such 
system of cultivating its own members.”88	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Furthermore, others point to the lack of agreed-upon protocol between the “yotou” 
(ruling party) and “seifu” (the government) under DPJ rule, arguing that this creates greater 
unpredictability in the decision-making process. “Because the expected role of the party kept 
changing after the DPJ took the government in September 2009, the DPJ is still in the period of 
trial and error on establishing the protocol of the relationship between the party and the 
government,” one MOD official speculates.89 Many government officials criticize Hatoyama’s 
decision to eliminate the PARC in September 2009. “Because of that decision, DPJ politicians 
who were not appointed ministers, deputy ministers, or parliamentary vice-ministers in the 
government lost their official venue to engage in policy discussions. This was not constructive, 
because it made them feel excluded from policy- and decision-making, and this prompted them 
to feel at liberty to be critical of the policy put forward by their DPJ colleagues in government 
posts.”90  
 
Finally, many identified a sense of mistrust among DPJ politicians toward the 
bureaucracy and an instinct to exclude bureaucrats from policy discussions as the difference in 
the two major parties’ approaches. They point to the Hatoyama government’s move to eliminate 
jikan kaigi (vice-ministerial meetings) as the decision that symbolizes the DPJ’s mistrust of the 
bureaucracy. Many also pointed out that in the very early days of the Hatoyama cabinet, the 
seimu sanyaku (the four politically appointed officials in each ministry – the minister, deputy 
minister and two parliamentary vice-ministers) “tried to do everything, from making decisions 
on major policy issues to briefing news reporters.”91 More specifically, many suggest that the 
Hatoyama Cabinet’s designation of the seimu sanyaku kaigi (meetings among these politically-
appointed officials minister) as the locus of final decision-making created “a great deal of 
unpredictability” in the policy- and decision-making processes. One senior MOD official admits 
that, because the seimu sanyaku now make the final decision on all matters in the absence of 
bureaucrats, “it has become difficult for us bureaucrats to manage the policy- and decision-
making processes.”92	  
Implications for Japan’s Future Security Policy Making Process 
 
This case study has examined the process by which the Japanese government revised its 
NDPG in 2004 and 2010, comparing the roles played by ruling-party politicians. The comparison 
illustrates that the NDPG revision in 2010 under the DPJ involved participation by ruling-party 
politicians that was more competitive and intrusive. It also reveals that DPJ politicians engaged 
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in the 2010 process in a more disorganized way than their LDP/Koumeitou counterparts did in 
2004. Government officials, as well as LDP and Koumeitou politicians, attribute this difference 
in the level and nature of politician engagement to differences in party structure (hierarchical vs. 
relatively egalitarian) and policy- and decision-making processes between the LDP/Koumeitou 
and the DPJ. 
 
But how did these differences in policy making approaches affect the actual content of 
the NDPG? Some argue that the DPJ’s more intrusive and competitive participation in the 
debate did not affect the content of the 2010 NDPG to any significant degree. “They use 
different terminology, such as ‘dynamic defense force’, of course,” one LDP politician says, “but 
when I read the 2010 NDPG, frankly speaking, I cannot see how it differs from the 2004 
NDPG.”93	  Even many MOD officials and SDF officers quietly agree, concurring with the 
assessment that DPJ politicians were particularly keen on being perceived as the ones in charge, 
not bureaucrats, throughout the revision process.94	  
 
If different levels of politician participation do not necessarily lead to a considerable 
policy change, can one argue that even with the DPJ’s recent changes in policy- and decision-
making processes, security policy will not be subject to as much volatility as anticipated? While 
it is too early at this point to provide a definitive answer, the tentative answer might return to the 
notion of political salience discussed above.  
 
One counterexample of an issue that has become vulnerable to political volatility under 
the DPJ – compared to the NDPG, at least – is the Japanese government’s position on its Three 
Principles of Arms Exports (or simply “Three Principles” for short). The Three Principles, 
originally defined by then-Prime Minister Sato in 1967, prohibit Japan from exporting arms to 
(1) countries that are involved in armed conflicts, (2) countries that are the subject of United 
Nations (UN) sanctions, and (3) countries of the Communist bloc.95 Additional conditions were 
attached to these principles in 1976 by Prime Minister Takeo Miki that effectively banned 
Japanese arms exports completely.96 	  Since then, the Three Principles have been treated as 
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establishing a Japanese policy of not engaging in arms exports. While there have recently been 
calls to revise this policy, the government has not yet changed it. Even though both the March 
2004 report by the LDP’s Committee on National Defense and the 2004 Araki Commission 
briefly mentioned the possibility that Japan might need to revise its position on the Three 
Principles, the 2004 NDPG did not embrace the idea.97 
 
By 2010, there were rising expectations that the revised NDPG might include the 
announcement of a change in Japan’s policy on the Three Principles. The Sato Commission and 
the DPJ’s Research Committee on Foreign Affairs and National Security both called for the 
revision of the Three Principles in their reports.98 In the debate in the House of Councillors’ 
Budget Committee in late October 2010, then-Defense Minister Kitazawa, who had earlier 
suggested his interest in seeing the issue discussed, explicitly indicated that he believed the 
Three Principles were constraining Japanese industry and that he would like to discuss how the 
government might revise its position.99 In late November 2010, Japanese mass media even began 
to report that Prime Minister Kan had agreed to revise Japan’s policy on the Three Principles.100 
In early December 2010, less than two weeks before the release of the NDPG, the media reported 
that the critical members of the Kan Cabinet – the chief cabinet secretary, foreign minister, 
defense minister, and finance minister – had agreed to incorporate the revision of the Three 
Principles in the NDPG.101	  
 
However, following a meeting with Fukushima Mizuho, the head of the Social 
Democratic Party of Japan (SDPJ), on December 6 2010, Kan reversed his earlier position and 
decided not to proceed with the revision of the Three Principles. Analyses in the media – which 
took a critical tone across the board – suggested that Kan abandoned revision of the Three 
Principles in order to secure the SDPJ’s cooperation on the budget and other domestic-issue 
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legislation.102 However, several Japanese reporters suggested that Kan used his meeting with 
Fukushima only as an excuse. One Japanese reporter very close to Kan reveals, “Kan was not 
happy with Sengoku, who talked with other ministers and came up with the recommendation to 
revise Three Principles without getting his prior approval. Kan is a liberal. He was never 
positive about changing the Three Principles, and the need to gain the SDPJ’s support for his key 
domestic agenda, including the budget, was a perfect excuse for him not to do so.”103	  
 
MOD officials argue that if coordination within the government over revising the Three 
Principle had taken place under LDP/Koumeitou rule, such a dramatic reversal would not have 
occurred: “Once things were approved within the LDP and Koumeitou coalition, there was no 
way for a single politician, even the prime minister, to undo the approval.” These officials 
suggest that Kan’s last-minute reversal points to a fundamental flaw in the DPJ’s decision-
making process. One MOD official explains, “They have no decision-making process that 
everyone in the party respects because the party leadership under Hatoyama stripped DPJ 
politicians who do not have a senior position in the government of the opportunity to participate 
in the policymaking debate. Even though some of those changes were undone after Kan took 
over, the DPJ still has not established a process through which they form consensus within the 
party through discussion… Because of that, the majority of DPJ politicians feel excluded from 
the party’s decision-making process and therefore feel entitled to openly express their 
disagreement with the party’s position.”104	  
 
This has important implications for the U.S.-Japan alliance. If the DPJ’s institutional 
changes in policy- and decision-making increase politician participation in detailed policy 
discussions in the long run, this would expose security issues – which have been carefully 
managed by a limited number of government officials and bureaucrats – to a greater risk of 
politicization. If the developments in the relocation of Futenma MCAS could serve as any guide, 
this would not be constructive. 
 
The heightened potential for further politicization of security issues as a result of future 
changes in party control of the government may also lead to the politicization of senior 
bureaucrats in the government. A wholesale turnover of senior non-politically-appointed 
government officials with each change of government has not occurred in Japan thus far. As 
long as Japan maintains its parliamentary system and the election cycle thus remains somewhat 
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unpredictable, it is unlikely that the Japanese government will adopt a personnel system similar 
to that of the United States, where mid-level and senior official positions undergo major turnover 
in accordance with the presidential election cycle. However, as security policy faces a greater 
risk of being politicized, it is difficult to imagine that senior government officials (deputy 
director-general and above) will be insulated from changes of government. For instance, it may 
become difficult for a director-general who worked for a DPJ minister to stay in his or her 
position under a new LDP minister. One DPJ politician indeed points to this possibility: he 
proposes that in order for seiji shudo to be truly effective, “the bureaucrats who serve the 
politicians in government agencies either must share the politicians’ ideas for policy issues or at 
minimum remain completely neutral and function as a faithful executor of politicians’ orders.”105	  
 
Nor will the close-knit community of security policy experts outside the government be 
insulated from the effects of politicization of security issues. In the past, since security policy 
issues largely escaped scrutiny in politics, they were managed by a relatively small community 
of current and former government officials from MOFA, MOD, METI, and the National Police 
Agency (NPA), as well as a small number of non-government security policy experts often 
consulted by government officials. Until the change of government in September 2009, this 
community remained largely non-partisan; there was no room for partisanship during the six 
decades of LDP rule. However, as security policies increasingly become a part of partisan 
debate, divisions could emerge within this community between those more closely aligned with 
the LDP and others more closely affiliated with the DPJ. Will experts who were members of the 
Council on Security and Defense Capabilities for the New Era or Sengoku’s “Support Group” be 
re-appointed to government-commissioned advisory panels when the LDP takes back the 
government? 
 
Finally, greater politicization of security issues may open the door to greater media and 
public opinion influence. Since security policies have been managed by a small group of 
government officials and scholars, the impact of the media and public opinion has been 
negligible. However, as politicians who feel an acute need to be responsive to the public grow 
more involved in both the policy process and its outcomes, media and public opinion may grow 
more influential. 
 
It is clearly too early to make a definitive argument about the implications of the 2009 
change of government in Japan. It will take several election cycles and changes in government 
to assess the full impact of politicians’ increased participation in security policy discourse. This 
report suggests greater unpredictability in security policymaking, but often more in process than 
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in outcomes, and often only in proportion to the popular salience of the issue at hand. These 
developments in Japan warrant a careful, sustained observation of developments in the 
relationships between politicians and bureaucrats and between political parties and the 
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